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<p>It is not always necessary to accumulate gold and silver, in order to
enable a country to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and
armies in distant countries. Fleets and armies are maintained, not with
gold and silver, but with consumable goods. The nation which, from the
annual produce of its domestic industry, from the annual revenue arising
out of its lands, and labour, and consumable stock, has wherewithal to
purchase those consumable goods in distant countries, can maintain foreign
wars there.</p>
<p>A nation may purchase the pay and provisions of an army in a distant
country three different ways; by sending abroad either, first, some part
of its accumulated gold and silver; or, secondly, some part of the annual
produce of its manufactures; or, last of all, some part of its annual rude
produce.</p>
<p>The gold and silver which can properly be considered as accumulated, or
stored up in any country, may be distinguished into three parts; first,
the circulating money; secondly, the plate of private families; and, last
of all, the money which may have been collected by many years parsimony,
and laid up in the treasury of the prince.</p>
<p>It can seldom happen that much can be spared from the circulating money of
the country; because in that there can seldom be much redundancy. The
value of goods annually bought and sold in any country requires a certain
quantity of money to circulate and distribute them to their proper
consumers, and can give employment to no more. The channel of circulation
necessarily draws to itself a sum sufficient to fill it, and never admits
any more. Something, however, is generally withdrawn from this channel in
the case of foreign war. By the great number of people who are maintained
abroad, fewer are maintained at home. Fewer goods are circulated there,
and less money becomes necessary to circulate them. An extraordinary
quantity of paper money of some sort or other, too, such as exchequer
notes, navy bills, and bank bills, in England, is generally issued upon
such occasions, and, by supplying the place of circulating gold and
silver, gives an opportunity of sending a greater quantity of it abroad.
All this, however, could afford but a poor resource for maintaining a
foreign war, of great expense, and several years duration.</p>
<p>The melting down of the plate of private families has, upon every
occasion, been found a still more insignificant one. The French, in the
beginning of the last war, did not derive so much advantage from this
expedient as to compensate the loss of the fashion.</p>
<p>The accumulated treasures of the prince have in former times afforded a
much greater and more lasting resource. In the present times, if you
except the king of Prussia, to accumulate treasure seems to be no part of
the policy of European princes.</p>
<p>The funds which maintained the foreign wars of the present century, the
most expensive perhaps which history records, seem to have had little
dependency upon the exportation either of the circulating money, or of the
plate of private families, or of the treasure of the prince. The last
French war cost Great Britain upwards of �90,000,000, including not only
the �75,000,000 of new debt that was contracted, but the additional 2s. in
the pound land-tax, and what was annually borrowed of the sinking fund.
More than two-thirds of this expense were laid out in distant countries;
in Germany, Portugal, America, in the ports of the Mediterranean, in the
East and West Indies. The kings of England had no accumulated treasure. We
never heard of any extraordinary quantity of plate being melted down. The
circulating gold and silver of the country had not been supposed to exceed
�18,000,000. Since the late recoinage of the gold, however, it is believed
to have been a good deal under-rated. Let us suppose, therefore, according
to the most exaggerated computation which I remember to have either seen
or heard of, that, gold and silver together, it amounted to �30,000,000.
Had the war been carried on by means of our money, the whole of it must,
even according to this computation, have been sent out and returned again,
at least twice in a period of between six and seven years. Should this be
supposed, it would afford the most decisive argument, to demonstrate how
unnecessary it is for government to watch over the preservation of money,
since, upon this supposition, the whole money of the country must have
gone from it, and returned to it again, two different times in so short a
period, without any body's knowing any thing of the matter. The channel of
circulation, however, never appeared more empty than usual during any part
of this period. Few people wanted money who had wherewithal to pay for it.
The profits of foreign trade, indeed, were greater than usual during the
whole war, but especially towards the end of it. This occasioned, what it
always occasions, a general over-trading in all the ports of Great
Britain; and this again occasioned the usual complaint of the scarcity of
money, which always follows over-trading. Many people wanted it, who had
neither wherewithal to buy it, nor credit to borrow it; and because the
debtors found it difficult to borrow, the creditors found it difficult to
get payment. Gold and silver, however, were generally to be had for their
value, by those who had that value to give for them.</p>
<p>The enormous expense of the late war, therefore, must have been chiefly
defrayed, not by the exportation of gold and silver, but by that of
British commodities of some kind or other. When the government, or those
who acted under them, contracted with a merchant for a remittance to some
foreign country, he would naturally endeavour to pay his foreign
correspondent, upon whom he granted a bill, by sending abroad rather
commodities than gold and silver. If the commodities of Great Britain were
not in demand in that country, he would endeavour to send them to some
other country in which he could purchase a bill upon that country. The
transportation of commodities, when properly suited to the market, is
always attended with a considerable profit; whereas that of gold and
silver is scarce ever attended with any. When those metals are sent abroad
in order to purchase foreign commodities, the merchant's profit arises,
not from the purchase, but from the sale of the returns. But when they are
sent abroad merely to pay a debt, he gets no returns, and consequently no
profit. He naturally, therefore, exerts his invention to find out a way of
paying his foreign debts, rather by the exportation of commodities, than
by that of gold and silver. The great quantity of British goods, exported
during the course of the late war, without bringing back any returns, is
accordingly remarked by the author of the Present State of the Nation.</p>
<p>Besides the three sorts of gold and silver above mentioned, there is in
all great commercial countries a good deal of bullion alternately imported
and exported, for the purposes of foreign trade. This bullion, as it
circulates among different commercial countries, in the same manner as the
national coin circulates in every country, may be considered as the money
of the great mercantile republic. The national coin receives its movement
and direction from the commodities circulated within the precincts of each
particular country; the money in the mercantile republic, from those
circulated between different countries. Both are employed in facilitating
exchanges, the one between different individuals of the same, the other
between those of different nations. Part of this money of the great
mercantile republic may have been, and probably was, employed in carrying
on the late war. In time of a general war, it is natural to suppose that a
movement and direction should be impressed upon it, different from what it
usually follows in profound peace, that it should circulate more about the
seat of the war, and be more employed in purchasing there, and in the
neighbouring countries, the pay and provisions of the different armies.
But whatever part of this money of the mercantile republic Great Britain
may have annually employed in this manner, it must have been annually
purchased, either with British commodities, or with something else that
had been purchased with them; which still brings us back to commodities,
to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, as the
ultimate resources which enabled us to carry on the war. It is natural,
indeed, to suppose, that so great an annual expense must have been
defrayed from a great annual produce. The expense of 1761, for example,
amounted to more than �19,000,000. No accumulation could have supported so
great an annual profusion. There is no annual produce, even of gold and
silver, which could have supported it. The whole gold and silver annually
imported into both Spain and Portugal, according to the best accounts,
does not commonly much exceed �6,000,000 sterling, which, in some years,
would scarce have paid four months expense of the late war.</p>
<p>The commodities most proper for being transported to distant countries, in
order to purchase there either the pay and provisions of an army, or some
part of the money of the mercantile republic to be employed in purchasing
them, seem to be the finer and more improved manufactures; such as contain
a great value in a small bulk, and can therefore be exported to a great
distance at little expense. A country whose industry produces a great
annual surplus of such manufactures, which are usually exported to foreign
countries, may carry on for many years a very expensive foreign war,
without either exporting any considerable quantity of gold and silver, or
even having any such quantity to export. A considerable part of the annual
surplus of its manufactures must, indeed, in this case, be exported
without bringing back any returns to the country, though it does to the
merchant; the government purchasing of the merchant his bills upon foreign
countries, in order to purchase there the pay and provisions of an army.
Some part of this surplus, however, may still continue to bring back a
return. The manufacturers during; the war will have a double demand upon
them, and be called upon first to work up goods to be sent abroad, for
paying the bills drawn upon foreign countries for the pay and provisions
of the army: and, secondly, to work up such as are necessary for
purchasing the common returns that had usually been consumed in the
country. In the midst of the most destructive foreign war, therefore, the
greater part of manufactures may frequently flourish greatly; and, on the
contrary, they may decline on the return of peace. They may flourish
amidst the ruin of their country, and begin to decay upon the return of
its prosperity. The different state of many different branches of the
British manufactures during the late war, and for some time after the
peace, may serve as an illustration of what has been just now said.</p>
<p>No foreign war, of great expense or duration, could conveniently be
carried on by the exportation of the rude produce of the soil. The expense
of sending such a quantity of it into a foreign country as might purchase
the pay and provisions of an army would be too great. Few countries, too,
produce much more rude produce than what is sufficient for the subsistence
of their own inhabitants. To send abroad any great quantity of it,
therefore, would be to send abroad a part of the necessary subsistence of
the people. It is otherwise with the exportation of manufactures. The
maintenance of the people employed in them is kept at home, and only the
surplus part of their work is exported. Mr Hume frequently takes notice of
the inability of the ancient kings of England to carry on, without
interruption, any foreign war of long duration. The English in those days
had nothing wherewithal to purchase the pay and provisions of their armies
in foreign countries, but either the rude produce of the soil, of which no
considerable part could be spared from the home consumption, or a few
manufactures of the coarsest kind, of which, as well as of the rude
produce, the transportation was too expensive. This inability did not
arise from the want of money, but of the finer and more improved
manufactures. Buying and selling was transacted by means of money in
England then as well as now. The quantity of circulating money must have
borne the same proportion, to the number and value of purchases and sales
usually transacted at that time, which it does to those transacted at
present; or, rather, it must have borne a greater proportion, because
there was then no paper, which now occupies a great part of the employment
of gold and silver. Among nations to whom commerce and manufactures are
little known, the sovereign, upon extraordinary occasions, can seldom draw
any considerable aid from his subjects, for reasons which shall be
explained hereafter. It is in such countries, therefore, that he generally
endeavours to accumulate a treasure, as the only resource against such
emergencies. Independent of this necessity, he is, in such a situation,
naturally disposed to the parsimony requisite for accumulation. In that
simple state, the expense even of a sovereign is not directed by the
vanity which delights in the gaudy finery of a court, but is employed in
bounty to his tenants, and hospitality to his retainers. But bounty and
hospitality very seldom lead to extravagance; though vanity almost always
does. Every Tartar chief, accordingly, has a treasure. The treasures of
Mazepa, chief of the Cossacks in the Ukraine, the famous ally of Charles
XII., are said to have been very great. The French kings of the
Merovingian race had all treasures. When they divided their kingdom among
their different children, they divided their treasures too. The Saxon
princes, and the first kings after the Conquest, seem likewise to have
accumulated treasures. The first exploit of every new reign was commonly
to seize the treasure of the preceding king, as the most essential measure
for securing the succession. The sovereigns of improved and commercial
countries are not under the same necessity of accumulating treasures,
because they can generally draw from their subjects extraordinary aids
upon extraordinary occasions. They are likewise less disposed to do so.
They naturally, perhaps necessarily, follow the mode of the times; and
their expense comes to be regulated by the same extravagant vanity which
directs that of all the other great proprietors in their dominions. The
insignificant pageantry of their court becomes every day more brilliant;
and the expense of it not only prevents accumulation, but frequently
encroaches upon the funds destined for more necessary expenses. What
Dercyllidas said of the court of Persia, may be applied to that of several
European princes, that he saw there much splendour, but little strength,
and many servants, but few soldiers.</p>
<p>The importation of gold and silver is not the principal, much less the
sole benefit, which a nation derives from its foreign trade. Between
whatever places foreign trade is carried on, they all of them derive two
distinct benefits from it. It carries out that surplus part of the produce
of their land and labour for which there is no demand among them, and
brings back in return for it something else for which there is a demand.
It gives a value to their superfluities, by exchanging them for something
else, which may satisfy a part of their wants and increase their
enjoyments. By means of it, the narrowness of the home market does not
hinder the division of labour in any particular branch of art or
manufacture from being carried to the highest perfection. By opening a
more extensive market for whatever part of the produce of their labour may
exceed the home consumption, it encourages them to improve its productive
power, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to
increase the real revenue and wealth of the society. These great and
important services foreign trade is continually occupied in performing to
all the different countries between which it is carried on. They all
derive great benefit from it, though that in which the merchant resides
generally derives the greatest, as he is generally more employed in
supplying the wants, and carrying out the superfluities of his own, than
of any other particular country. To import the gold and silver which may
be wanted into the countries which have no mines, is, no doubt a part of
the business of foreign commerce. It is, however, a most insignificant
part of it. A country which carried on foreign trade merely upon this
account, could scarce have occasion to freight a ship in a century.</p>
<p>It is not by the importation of gold and silver that the discovery of
America has enriched Europe. By the abundance of the American mines, those
metals have become cheaper. A service of plate can now be purchased for
about a third part of the corn, or a third part of the labour, which it
would have cost in the fifteenth century. With the same annual expense of
labour and commodities, Europe can annually purchase about three times the
quantity of plate which it could have purchased at that time. But when a
commodity comes to be sold for a third part of what bad been its usual
price, not only those who purchased it before can purchase three times
their former quantity, but it is brought down to the level of a much
greater number of purchasers, perhaps to more than ten, perhaps to more
than twenty times the former number. So that there may be in Europe at
present, not only more than three times, but more than twenty or thirty
times the quantity of plate which would have been in it, even in its
present state of improvement, had the discovery of the American mines
never been made. So far Europe has, no doubt, gained a real conveniency,
though surely a very trifling one. The cheapness of gold and silver
renders those metals rather less fit for the purposes of money than they
were before. In order to make the same purchases, we must load ourselves
with a greater quantity of them, and carry about a shilling in our pocket,
where a groat would have done before. It is difficult to say which is most
trifling, this inconveniency, or the opposite conveniency. Neither the one
nor the other could have made any very essential change in the state of
Europe. The discovery of America, however, certainly made a most essential
one. By opening a new and inexhaustible market to all the commodities of
Europe, it gave occasion to new divisions of labour and improvements of
art, which in the narrow circle of the ancient commerce could never have
taken place, for want of a market to take off the greater part of their
produce. The productive powers of labour were improved, and its produce
increased in all the different countries of Europe, and together with it
the real revenue and wealth of the inhabitants. The commodities of Europe
were almost all new to America, and many of those of America were new to
Europe. A new set of exchanges, therefore, began to take place, which had
never been thought of before, and which should naturally have proved as
advantageous to the new, as it certainly did to the old continent. The
savage injustice of the Europeans rendered an event, which ought to have
been beneficial to all, ruinous and destructive to several of those
unfortunate countries.</p>
<p>The discovery of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope,
which happened much about the same time, opened perhaps a still more
extensive range to foreign commerce, than even that of America,
notwithstanding the greater distance. There were but two nations in
America, in any respect, superior to the savages, and these were destroyed
almost as soon as discovered. The rest were mere savages. But the empires
of China, Indostan, Japan, as well as several others in the East Indies,
without having richer mines of gold or silver, were, in every other
respect, much richer, better cultivated, and more advanced in all arts and
manufactures, than either Mexico or Peru, even though we should credit,
what plainly deserves no credit, the exaggerated accounts of the Spanish
writers concerning the ancient state of those empires. But rich and
civilized nations can always exchange to a much greater value with one
another, than with savages and barbarians. Europe, however, has hitherto
derived much less advantage from its commerce with the East Indies, than
from that with America. The Portuguese monopolized the East India trade to
themselves for about a century; and it was only indirectly, and through
them, that the other nations of Europe could either send out or receive
any goods from that country. When the Dutch, in the beginning of the last
century, began to encroach upon them, they vested their whole East India
commerce in an exclusive company. The English, French, Swedes, and Danes,
have all followed their example; so that no great nation of Europe has
ever yet had the benefit of a free commerce to the East Indies. No other
reason need be assigned why it has never been so advantageous as the trade
to America, which, between almost every nation of Europe and its own
colonies, is free to all its subjects. The exclusive privileges of those
East India companies, their great riches, the great favour and protection
which these have procured them from their respective governments, have
excited much envy against them. This envy has frequently represented their
trade as altogether pernicious, on account of the great quantities of
silver which it every year exports from the countries from which it is
carried on. The parties concerned have replied, that their trade by this
continual exportation of silver, might indeed tend to impoverish Europe in
general, but not the particular country from which it was carried on;
because, by the exportation of a part of the returns to other European
countries, it annually brought home a much greater quantity of that metal
than it carried out. Both the objection and the reply are founded in the
popular notion which I have been just now examining. It is therefore
unnecessary to say any thing further about either. By the annual
exportation of silver to the East Indies, plate is probably somewhat
dearer in Europe than it otherwise might have been; and coined silver
probably purchases a larger quantity both of labour and commodities. The
former of these two effects is a very small loss, the latter a very small
advantage; both too insignificant to deserve any part of the public
attention. The trade to the East Indies, by opening a market to the
commodities of Europe, or, what comes nearly to the same thing, to the
gold and silver which is purchased with those commodities, must
necessarily tend to increase the annual production of European
commodities, and consequently the real wealth and revenue of Europe. That
it has hitherto increased them so little, is probably owing to the
restraints which it everywhere labours under.</p>
<p>I thought it necessary, though at the hazard of being tedious, to examine
at full length this popular notion, that wealth consists in money or in
gold and silver. Money, in common language, as I have already observed,
frequently signifies wealth; and this ambiguity of expression has rendered
this popular notion so familiar to us, that even they who are convinced of
its absurdity, are very apt to forget their own principles, and, in the
course of their reasonings, to take it for granted as a certain and
undeniable truth. Some of the best English writers upon commerce set out
with observing, that the wealth of a country consists, not in its gold and
silver only, but in its lands, houses, and consumable goods of all
different kinds. In the course of their reasonings, however, the lands,
houses, and consumable goods, seem to slip out of their memory; and the
strain of their argument frequently supposes that all wealth consists in
gold and silver, and that to multiply those metals is the great object of
national industry and commerce.</p>
<p>The two principles being established, however, that wealth consisted in
gold and silver, and that those metals could be brought into a country
which had no mines, only by the balance of trade, or by exporting to a
greater value than it imported; it necessarily became the great object of
political economy to diminish as much as possible the importation of
foreign goods for home consumption, and to increase as much as possible
the exportation of the produce of domestic industry. Its two great engines
for enriching the country, therefore, were restraints upon importation,
and encouragement to exportation.</p>
<p>The restraints upon importation were of two kinds.</p>
<p>First, restraints upon the importation of such foreign goods for home
consumption as could be produced at home, from whatever country they were
imported.</p>
<p>Secondly, restraints upon the importation of goods of almost all kinds,
from those particular countries with which the balance of trade was
supposed to be disadvantageous.</p>
<p>Those different restraints consisted sometimes in high duties, and
sometimes in absolute prohibitions.</p>
<p>Exportation was encouraged sometimes by drawbacks, sometimes by bounties,
sometimes by advantageous treaties of commerce with foreign states, and
sometimes by the establishment of colonies in distant countries.</p>
<p>Drawbacks were given upon two different occasions. When the home
manufactures were subject to any duty or excise, either the whole or a
part of it was frequently drawn back upon their exportation; and when
foreign goods liable to a duty were imported, in order to be exported
again, either the whole or a part of this duty was sometimes given back
upon such exportation.</p>
<p>Bounties were given for the encouragement, either of some beginning
manufactures, or of such sorts of industry of other kinds as were supposed
to deserve particular favour.</p>
<p>By advantageous treaties of commerce, particular privileges were procured
in some foreign state for the goods and merchants of the country, beyond
what were granted to those of other countries.</p>
<p>By the establishment of colonies in distant countries, not only particular
privileges, but a monopoly was frequently procured for the goods and
merchants of the country which established them.</p>
<p>The two sorts of restraints upon importation above mentioned, together
with these four encouragements to exportation, constitute the six
principal means by which the commercial system proposes to increase the
quantity of gold and silver in any country, by turning the balance of
trade in its favour. I shall consider each of them in a particular
chapter, and, without taking much farther notice of their supposed
tendency to bring money into the country, I shall examine chiefly what are
likely to be the effects of each of them upon the annual produce of its
industry. According as they tend either to increase or diminish the value
of this annual produce, they must evidently tend either to increase or
diminish the real wealth and revenue of the country.</p>
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