<h2><SPAN name="CHAPTER_XV" id="CHAPTER_XV"></SPAN>CHAPTER XV</h2>
<h3>THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876 AND ITS RESULTS</h3>
<p>The Presidential election was held in 1876. The Republicans had carried
the country in 1872 by such a decisive majority that it indicated many
years of continued Republican ascendency in the National Government. But
the severe reverses sustained by that party at the polls two years later
completely changed this situation and outlook. Democrats confidently
expected and Republicans seriously apprehended that the Presidential
election of 1876 would result in a substantial Democratic victory. Mr.
Blaine was the leading candidate for the Republican nomination, but he
had bitter opposition in the ranks of his own party. That opposition
came chiefly from friends and supporters of Senator Conkling at the
North and from Southern Republicans generally. The opposition of the
Conkling men to Mr. Blaine was largely personal; while southern
Republicans were opposed to him on account of his having caused the
defeat of the Federal Elections Bill. The great majority of southern
Republicans supported Senator Oliver P. Morton of Indiana.</p>
<p>After the National Convention had been organized, it looked for a while
as if Mr. Blaine's nomination was a foregone conclusion. Hon. Edward
McPherson, of Pennsylvania,—a strong Blaine man,—had been made
President of the Convention. In placing Mr. Blaine's name in nomination,
Hon. Robert G. Ingersoll of Illinois made such an eloquent and effective
speech that he came very near carrying the Convention by storm, and thus
securing the nomination of the statesman from Maine. But the opposition
to Mr. Blaine was too well organized to allow the Convention to be
stampeded, even by the power and eloquence of an Ingersoll. It was this
speech that gave Mr. Ingersoll his national fame and brought him to the
front as a public speaker and lecturer. It was the most eloquent and
impressive speech that was delivered during the sitting of the
Convention. After a bitter struggle of many hours, and after a number of
fruitless ballots, the Convention finally nominated Gov. R.B. Hayes, of
Ohio, as a compromise candidate. This result was brought about through a
union of the combined opposition to Mr. Blaine. Hon. Wm. A. Wheeler, of
New York, was nominated for Vice-President and the work of the
Convention was over.</p>
<p>The Democrats nominated ex-Governor Samuel J. Tilden, of New York, for
President, and Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, for Vice-President.
Their platform pledged many radical reforms in the administration of the
government. This ticket was made with the hope that it would be
successful in the doubtful and debatable States of New York, New Jersey,
Indiana, and Connecticut, which, with the Solid South, would constitute
a majority of the electoral college, even if all the other States should
go Republican, which was not anticipated.</p>
<p>That the prospect of Democratic success was exceedingly bright and the
probability of a Republican victory extremely dark, was generally
conceded. The South was counted upon to be solid in its support of the
Democratic ticket, for the methods that had been successfully
inaugurated in Mississippi the year before, to overcome a Republican
majority of more than twenty thousand, were to be introduced and adopted
in all the other States of that section in which conditions were
practically the same as in Mississippi.</p>
<p>To insure success, therefore, it was only necessary for the Democrats to
concentrate their efforts upon the four doubtful States outside of the
Solid South. Up to a certain point the plan worked well. Every
indication seemed to point to its successful consummation. As had been
anticipated, the Democrats were successful in the four doubtful Northern
States, and they also carried, on the face of the returns, every
Southern State, just as had been planned; the Mississippi methods
having been adopted in such of them as had Republican majorities to
overcome. Since through those methods the Democrats had succeeded in
overcoming a large Republican majority in Mississippi, there was no
reason why the same methods should not produce like results in South
Carolina, in Louisiana, and in Florida. In fact, it was looked upon as a
reflection upon the bravery and party loyalty of the Democracy of those
States if they could not do what had been done under like conditions in
Mississippi. Hence those States <i>had</i> to be carried, "peaceably and
fairly," of course, "but they must be carried just the same." Failure to
carry them was out of the question, because too much was involved.
According to the plans and calculations that had been carefully made, no
Southern State could be lost. While it might be possible to win without
all of them, still it was not believed to be safe to run any such risk,
or take any such chance. If the Democrats should happen to carry a state
that was not included in the combination, so much the better.</p>
<p>Everything seemed to work admirably. That it was a plan by which
elections could be easily carried, with or without votes, had been
clearly demonstrated. On the face of the returns the majorities were
brought forth just as had been ordered and directed. But it seems that
such methods had been anticipated by the Republican governments in South
Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida, and that suitable steps had been
taken to prevent their successful consummation through the medium of
State Returning Boards. When the Returning Boards had rejected and
thrown out many of the majorities that had been returned from some of
the counties and parishes, the result was changed, and the Republican
candidates for Presidential electors were officially declared elected.
This gave the Republican candidates for President and Vice-President a
majority of one vote in the Electoral College. It has, of course, been
alleged by many,—and it is believed by some,—that the actions of those
Returning Boards defeated the will of the people as expressed at the
polls, thus bringing about the seating in the Presidential chair of the
man that had been fairly and honestly defeated. Yet, no one who is
familiar with the facts, and who is honest enough to admit them, will
deny that but for the inauguration in South Carolina, Florida, and
Louisiana, of the Mississippi methods, those three States would have
been as safely Republican at that time and in that election as were the
States of Pennsylvania and Vermont. But the plans of the Democratic
managers had been defeated. It was hard for them to lose a victory they
felt and believed to have been won by them, notwithstanding the
extraneous methods that had been employed to bring about such results.</p>
<hr />
<h2><SPAN name="CHAPTER_XVI" id="CHAPTER_XVI"></SPAN>CHAPTER XVI</h2>
<h3>EFFECTS OF THE REFORM ADMINISTRATION IN MISSISSIPPI</h3>
<p>Because the Democrats carried the election in Mississippi in 1875, they
did not thereby secure control of the State Government. That election
was for members of the Legislature, members of Congress and county
officers. Only one State officer was elected,—a State Treasurer,—to
fill the vacancy created by the death of Treasurer Holland. All the
other State officers were Republicans. But the Democrats could not
afford to wait until Governor Ames' term expired. They were determined
to get immediate control of the State Government. There was only one way
in which this could be done, and that was by impeachment.</p>
<p>This course they decided to take. It could not be truthfully denied that
Governor Ames was a clean, pure, and honest man. He had given the State
an excellent administration. The State judiciary had been kept up to the
high standard established by Governor Alcorn. Every dollar of the public
money had been collected, and honestly accounted for. The State was in a
prosperous condition. The rate of taxation had been greatly reduced,
and there was every prospect of a still further reduction before the end
of his administration. But these facts made no difference to those who
were flushed with the victory they had so easily won. They wanted the
offices, and were determined to have them, and that, too, without very
much delay. Hence, impeachment proceedings were immediately instituted
against the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor,—not in the interest of
reform, of good government or of low taxes, but simply in order to get
possession of the State Government.</p>
<p>The weakness of the case against the Governor was shown when it
developed that the strongest charge against him was that he had entered
into an alleged corrupt bargain with State Senator Cassidy, resulting in
Cassidy's appointment as one of the Judges of the Chancery Court.
Cassidy had been elected a member of the State Senate as a Democrat.
Notwithstanding that fact he voted for Mr. Bruce, the Republican caucus
nominee for United States Senator, and subsequently publicly identified
himself with the Republican party. Later his brother, William P.
Cassidy, and his law partner, Hon. J.F. Sessions, did likewise. In 1874
Sessions was elected to the State Senate as a Republican to serve out
the unexpired term of his law partner, Cassidy, who had resigned his
seat in the Senate upon his appointment as a Judge of the Chancery
Court.</p>
<p>Cassidy was a brilliant young man, and an able lawyer. That the
Governor should have selected him for an important judicial position was
both wise and proper. It was one of his best and most creditable
appointments and was generally commended as such when it was made. The
fact that he had been elected to the State Senate as a Democrat, and
shortly thereafter joined the Republican party was made the basis of the
charge that his change of party affiliation was the result of a corrupt
bargain between the Governor and himself, for which the Governor, but
not the Judge, should be impeached and removed from office. There were a
few other vague and unimportant charges, but this one, as weak as it
was, was the strongest of the number.</p>
<p>When the articles of impeachment were presented to the House, it was
seen that they were so weak and so groundless that the Governor believed
it would be an easy matter for him to discredit them even before an
antagonistic legislature. With that end in view, he employed several of
the ablest lawyers in the country to represent him. They came to Jackson
and commenced the preparation of the case, but it did not take them long
to find out that their case was a hopeless one. They soon found out to
their entire satisfaction that it was not to be a judicial trial, but a
political one and that the jury was already prepared for conviction
without regard to the law, the Constitution, the evidence, or the
facts. Governor Ames was to be convicted, not because he was guilty of
any offense, but because he was in the way of complete Democratic
control of the State Government.</p>
<p>Personally they had nothing against Ames. It was not the man but the
office they wanted, and that they were determined to have. They knew he
had committed no offense, but, as matters then stood, being a Republican
was an offense which justified removal from office. To punish him
otherwise, for anything he had done or failed to do, did not at any time
enter into their calculations. The Governorship was the prize at stake.
In this matter there was no concealment of their purposes and
intentions. As soon as the Governor's legal advisers found out what the
actual situation was, they saw it was useless to continue the fight.
Upon their advice, therefore, the Governor tendered his resignation,
which was promptly accepted. He then left the State never to return
again. If the impeachment proceedings had been instituted in good
faith,—upon an honest belief that the chief executive had committed
offenses which merited punishment,—the resignation would not have been
accepted. The fact that it was accepted,—and that, too, without
hesitation or question,—was equivalent to a confession that the purpose
of the proceedings was to get possession of the office. Short work was
made of the Lieutenant-Governor's case; and State Senator John M.
Stone, the Democratic President pro tem. of the State Senate, was duly
sworn in and installed as the acting Governor of the State. Thus
terminated a long series of questionable acts, the inauguration of which
had no other purpose than to secure the ascendency of one political
party over another in the administration of the government of the State.</p>
<p>The sanguinary revolution in the State of Mississippi in 1875 was
claimed to be in the interest of good administration and honest
government; it was an attempt to wrest the State from the control of
dishonest men,—negroes, carpet baggers, and scalawags,—and place it in
control of intelligent, pure, and honest white men. With that end in
view, Geo. M. Buchanan, a brave and gallant ex-Confederate soldier, was,
through questionable and indefensible methods, defeated for the office
of State Treasurer, and Wm. L. Hemmingway was declared elected. Yet when
the change took place it was found that every dollar of the public money
was accounted for. During the whole period of Republican administration
not a dollar had been misappropriated, nor had there been a single
defalcation, although millions of dollars had passed through the hands
of the fiscal agents of the State and of the different counties.</p>
<p>How was it with the new reform administration? Treasurer Hemmingway had
been in office only a comparatively short while when the startling
information was given out that he was a defaulter to the amount of
$315,612.19. William L. Hemmingway a defaulter! Could such a thing be
possible? Yes, it was an admitted and undisputed fact.</p>
<p>Mr. Hemmingway had been quite prominent in the politics of the State;
but those who knew the man, and I was one of those, had every reason to
believe that he was an honest man, and that he was the personification
of integrity. He was neither a speculator nor a gambler. Even after the
defalcation was made known there was nothing to indicate that any part
of the money had been appropriated to his own use. Yet the money had
mysteriously disappeared. Where was it? Who had it? These were questions
the people of the State desired to have answered, but they have never
yet been answered and, it is safe to say, they never will be. Hemmingway
no doubt could and can answer those questions, but he has not done so
and the probabilities are that he never will. He evidently believed that
to turn State's evidence would render him more culpable than to be
guilty of the act which he had allowed to be committed. He might have
been forced to make a confession, or at least been compelled to give the
prosecution a clue to the real criminal or criminals if the prosecution
had been in charge of persons who could not be suspected of being the
political beneficiaries of the methods by which it was possible for him
to be placed in charge of the office. It was hardly reasonable to expect
such men to make very much of an effort to secure a confession. In fact,
it seems to have been a relief to them to have the accused take the
position that he alone was the responsible party and that he was willing
to bear all the blame and assume all the consequences that would result
from the act. The names, therefore, of those who were the beneficiaries
of this remarkable defalcation will, no doubt, remain a secret in the
bosom of William L. Hemmingway, and will be buried with him in his
grave.</p>
<p>Hemmingway was tried, convicted, sentenced and served a term in the
State Prison; all of which he calmly endured rather than give the name
of any person having connection with that unfortunate affair. All the
satisfaction that the public can get with reference to it,—other than
the punishment to which Hemmingway was subjected,—is to indulge in
conjectures about it. One conjecture, and the most reasonable and
plausible one, is that if Hemmingway had made a full confession it might
have involved not only some men who were prominent and influential, but
perhaps the Democratic State organization as well. For it was a
well-known fact that in 1875 nearly every Democratic club in the State
was converted into an armed military company. To fully organize, equip,
and arm such a large body of men required an outlay of a large sum of
money. The money was evidently furnished by some persons or through some
organization. Those who raised the money, or who caused it to be raised,
no doubt had an eye to the main chance. A patriotic desire to have the
State redeemed (?) was not with them the actuating motive. When the
redemption (?) of the State was an accomplished fact they, no doubt,
felt that they were entitled to share in the fruits of that redemption.
Their idea evidently was that the State should be made to pay for its
own salvation and redemption, but the only way in which this could be
done was to have the people's money in the State treasury appropriated
for that purpose otherwise than by legislative enactment. This, as I
have already stated, is only a conjecture, but, under the circumstances,
it is the most reasonable and plausible one that can be imagined.</p>
<p>The case of Treasurer Hemmingway is conclusive evidence that in point of
efficiency, honesty and official integrity the Democratic party had no
advantage over the party that was placed in power chiefly through the
votes of colored men. What was true of Mississippi in this respect was
also true,—in a measure, at least,—of the other reconstructed States.</p>
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