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<ANTIMG id="coverpage" src="images/cover.jpg" alt="Richmond National Battlefield Park, Virginia" width-obs="500" height-obs="794" /></div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p02.jpg" alt="U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR · March 3, 1849" width-obs="300" height-obs="301" /></div>
<p class="center"><b>UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
<br/><span class="small">Stewart L. Udall, <i>Secretary</i></span></b></p>
<p class="center"><b>NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
<br/><span class="small">Conrad L. Wirth, <i>Director</i></span></b></p>
<p class="tbcenter"><i><b>HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER THIRTY-THREE</b></i></p>
<p>This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the
historical and archeological areas in the National Park System
administered by the National Park Service of the United States
Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government
Printing Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of
Documents, Washington 25, D.C. Price 25 cents.</p>
<div class="box">
<h1>RICHMOND <br/><span class="smaller">National Battlefield Park <br/>Virginia</span></h1>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p02a.jpg" alt="{Sniper}" width-obs="400" height-obs="436" /></div>
<p class="center"><i>by Joseph P. Cullen</i></p>
<p class="center smaller">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 33
<br/>Washington, D.C., 1961</p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_i">i</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig1"> <ANTIMG src="images/p03.jpg" alt="" width-obs="300" height-obs="376" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The National Park System, of which Richmond National Battlefield Park is a unit, is dedicated to conserving the scenic, scientific, and historic heritage of the United
States for the benefit and inspiration of its people.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_ii">ii</div>
<h2 id="toc" class="center"><i>Contents</i></h2>
<dt class="small"><i>Page</i>
<br/><SPAN href="#c1">Richmond</SPAN> 1
<br/><SPAN href="#c2">The Army of the Potomac</SPAN> 2
<dt class="center"><span class="sc">Part One</span>
<dt class="center"><span class="small">THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, SUMMER 1862</span>
<br/><SPAN href="#c3">On to Richmond</SPAN> 3
<br/><SPAN href="#c4">Up the Peninsula</SPAN> 4
<br/><SPAN href="#c5">Drewry’s Bluff</SPAN> 5
<br/><SPAN href="#c6">Seven Pines (Fair Oaks)</SPAN> 6
<br/><SPAN href="#c7">Lee Takes Command</SPAN> 9
<br/><SPAN href="#c8">The Seven Days Begin</SPAN> 12
<br/><SPAN href="#c9">Beaver Dam Creek (Ellerson’s Mill)</SPAN> 13
<br/><SPAN href="#c10">Gaines’ Mill</SPAN> 16
<br/><SPAN href="#c11">Savage Station</SPAN> 18
<br/><SPAN href="#c12">Glendale (Frayser’s Farm)</SPAN> 21
<br/><SPAN href="#c13">Malvern Hill</SPAN> 22
<br/><SPAN href="#c14">End of Campaign</SPAN> 24
<br/><SPAN href="#c15">The Years Between</SPAN> 27
<dt class="center"><span class="sc">Part Two</span>
<dt class="center"><span class="small">THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR RICHMOND, 1864-65</span>
<br/><SPAN href="#c16">Lincoln’s New Commander</SPAN> 28
<br/><SPAN href="#c17">Cold Harbor</SPAN> 29
<br/><SPAN href="#c18">Fort Harrison</SPAN> 37
<br/><SPAN href="#c19">Richmond Falls</SPAN> 40
<br/><SPAN href="#c20">The Park</SPAN> 46
<br/><SPAN href="#c21">Administration</SPAN> 46
<div class="pb" id="Page_iii">iii</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig2"> <ANTIMG src="images/p04.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="430" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Richmond, 1858.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_1">1</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig3"> <ANTIMG src="images/p04a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="225" /> <p class="pcap"></p> </div>
<p>The American Civil War <i>was unique in many respects. One
of the great turning points in American history, it was a national
tragedy of international significance. Simultaneously, it was the last of the
old wars and the first of the new. Although it began in a blaze of glamor,
romance, and chivalry, it ended in the ashes of misery, destruction, and death.
It was, as Walt Whitman said, “a strange, sad war.”</i></p>
<p class="tb">Richmond National Battlefield Park preserves the scenes of some
of the great battles that took place in the vicinity of the Confederate
Capital. When we visit these now quiet, peaceful woods and fields,
we feel an association with our past that is impossible to achieve
with the written or spoken word. Here we are not reminded of
the Blue or the Gray as such, only of the heroic struggle of men—men
with two different beliefs and philosophies, welded together
by the blood of battle, to give us our America of today.</p>
<h2 id="c1"><span class="small"><i>Richmond</i></span></h2>
<p>In session at Montgomery, Ala., in May 1861, the Confederate Congress
voted to remove the Capital of the Confederate States to
Richmond, Va. This decision, in effect, made Richmond a beleaguered
city for 4 years. Essentially, the move was dictated by
political and military considerations. The prestige of Virginia, richest
and most populous State in the South, was considered necessary
for the success of the Confederacy. For political reasons it was
believed that the Capital should be near the border States and the
heavy fighting expected there.</p>
<p>Second only to New Orleans, Richmond was the largest city in
the Confederacy, having a population of about 38,000. It was also
the center of iron manufacturing in the South. The Tredegar Iron
<span class="pb" id="Page_2">2</span>
Works, main source of cannon supply for the Southern armies, influenced
the choice of Richmond as the Confederate Capital and demanded
its defense. During the course of the war, Tredegar made
over 1,100 cannon, in addition to mines, torpedoes, propeller shafts,
and other war machinery. It expanded to include rolling mills,
forges, sawmills, and machine shops. The Richmond Laboratory
made over 72 million cartridges, along with grenades, gun carriages,
field artillery, and canteens, while the Richmond Armory had a capacity
for manufacturing 5,000 small arms a month.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig4"> <ANTIMG src="images/p05.jpg" alt="" width-obs="795" height-obs="408" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Tredegar Iron Works.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<p>Thus Richmond became the political, military, and manufacturing
center of the South, and the symbol of secession to the North.</p>
<p>Situated near the head of the navigable waters of the James
River, and within 110 miles of the National Capital at Washington,
Richmond was the key to the military planning of both sides. For
4 years the city remained the primary military objective of the
Union armies in the east. As one southern newspaper stated: “To
lose Richmond is to lose Virginia, and to lose Virginia is to lose
the key to the Southern Confederacy.”</p>
<h2 id="c2"><span class="small"><i>The Army of the Potomac</i></span></h2>
<p>In July 1861 the untrained Union Army of the Potomac suffered
disaster at Manassas (Bull Run) in the first attempt to drive into
Virginia and capture Richmond. President Abraham Lincoln then
appointed Gen. George B. McClellan the new commander of the
<span class="pb" id="Page_3">3</span>
demoralized army. McClellan reported: “I found no army to command
* * * just a mere collection of regiments cowering on the
banks of the Potomac.”</p>
<p>To this chaotic situation he brought order and discipline. During
the long winter months, the raw recruits were marshalled and
drilled into an efficient fighting machine of over 100,000 men—the
largest army ever commanded by one man in the history of the
western hemisphere. By the spring of 1862 this army was ready for
the supreme test—the goal was Richmond.</p>
<h2 class="center"><span class="sc">Part One</span> <br/>THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, SUMMER, 1862</h2>
<h2 id="c3"><span class="small"><i>On To Richmond</i></span></h2>
<p>Instead of marching overland, McClellan decided to take advantage
of Union control of the inland waters and transport his army, with
its vast supplies and materiel, down the Potomac River and across
Chesapeake Bay to the tip of the peninsula between the York and
James Rivers. Then with his supply ships steaming up the York,
he planned to march northwestward up the peninsula, join another
force under Gen. Irvin McDowell marching overland from Washington,
and together, converge on Richmond.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig5"> <ANTIMG src="images/p05a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="544" /> <p class="pcap"><i>McClellan’s plan of attack.</i> Painting by Sidney King.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_4">4</div>
<p>To accomplish this, McClellan undertook the largest amphibious
operation ever attempted in the western world. Over 400 steam
vessels, brigs, schooners, sloops, ferry boats, and barges assembled on
the Potomac River. In March 1862 these vessels ferried the Army
of the Potomac, with its 3,600 wagons, 700 ambulances, 300 pieces
of artillery, 2,500 head of cattle, and over 25,000 horses and mules,
to the southeast coast of Virginia. As Q. M. Gen. Rufus Ingalls
reported: “Operations so extensive and important as the rapid and
successful embarkation of such an army, with all its vast equipment,
its transfer to the peninsula, and its supply while there, had scarcely
any parallel in history.”</p>
<h2 id="c4"><span class="small"><i>Up The Peninsula</i></span></h2>
<p>After landing at Fortress Monroe the Federal troops pushed aside
the thinly held Confederate defenses at Yorktown and Williamsburg
and proceeded up the peninsula according to plan. But progress
was slow. Every day 500 tons of forage and subsistence were required
to keep the army in the field. Early in May it rained and
kept raining, day after dreary day. Federal soldiers had a saying:
“Virginia used to be in the Union—now it’s in the mud.” Dirt
roads turned into bottomless muck—creeks and gullies became swift
flowing streams—fields were swamps. Roads and bridges had to be
built and rebuilt, and still the thousands of wagons, horses, and
mules continually stuck in the mud.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig6"> <ANTIMG src="images/p06.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="504" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Sumner’s troops crossing Grapevine Bridge to reinforce Coach at Seven Pines.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_5">5</div>
<p>Realizing that an effective overland pursuit of the retreating Confederate
forces under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was out of the question
because of the weather and the condition of the roads, McClellan
on May 6 sent Gen. William B. Franklin’s division up the York
River by transport to West Point, terminus of the Richmond and
York River Railroad, in an attempt to cut off the Confederate
wagon train. Johnston anticipated the move, however, and on May
7 ordered Gen. W. H. C. Whiting’s troops to attack Franklin in
the battle of West Point, or Eltham’s Landing.</p>
<p>The attack was repulsed, but, even so, the wagon train managed
to continue safely to Richmond. McClellan, however, had cleared
the way to his next objective—the landing at White House on the
Pamunkey River, a tributary of the York. Here the railroad crossed
the Pamunkey on its way to West Point. This would be the
Union base of supply for the contemplated attack on Richmond.
This battle also cleared the way for the right wing of the Union
army, which would have to stay north and east of Richmond in order
to hook up with McDowell’s anticipated overland march from
Washington.</p>
<p>General Johnston, falling back steadily in front of McClellan’s slow
advance, was the target of severe criticism from Richmond newspapers
for not making a determined stand. But he wrote to Gen.
Robert E. Lee: “We are engaged in a species of warfare at which
we can never win. It is plain that Gen. McClellan will adhere to
the system adopted by him last summer, and depend for success upon
artillery and engineering. We can compete with him in neither.”</p>
<h2 id="c5"><span class="small"><i>Drewry’s Bluff</i></span></h2>
<p>After the fall of Norfolk on May 10 to the Union forces under Gen.
John Wool, the crew of the <i>Virginia</i> (<i>Merrimack</i>) scuttled their ship.
River pilots had advised that the iron-clad vessel could not navigate
the treacherous channel up the James River to Richmond. Loss of
the <i>Virginia</i> opened the river to Federal gunboats, and McClellan
immediately telegraphed the War Department: “I would now most
earnestly urge that our gunboats and the iron-clad boats be sent as
far as possible up the James river without delay. Instructions have
been given so that the Navy will receive prompt support wherever
and whenever required.”</p>
<p>Five Union gunboats, including the famous <i>Monitor</i>, started up
the James under Comdr. John Rogers in the <i>Galena</i>. By May 15
they reached Drewry’s Bluff, just 7 miles below Richmond. Here,
at a sharp bend, the Confederates had effectively obstructed the river
and erected powerful batteries on a 90-foot bluff.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_6">6</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig7"> <ANTIMG src="images/p07.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="353" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Battle of Drewry’s Bluff.</i> Diorama, Richmond National Battlefield Park Visitor Center.</p> </div>
<p>At 7 that morning the Federal gunboats opened fire on Fort Darling.
The battle raged for 4 hours while the fate of Richmond hung in
the balance, and near panic spread through the city. However, the
accurate fire of the heavy guns on the bluff, combined with effective
sharpshooting along the riverbanks, finally proved too much for
the gunboats, and the Federal fleet retreated down the river. One
Confederate officer observed: “* * * had Commander Rogers been
supported by a few brigades, landed at City Point or above on the
south side, Richmond would have been evacuated.”</p>
<p>Although the Secretary of the Navy requested “a cooperating land
force” to help the gunboats pass Fort Darling and take Richmond,
McClellan, despite his earlier promise of cooperation, wired the War
Department: “Am not yet ready to cooperate with them.” He neglected
to say when he would be ready. Richmond was never again
seriously threatened by water.</p>
<h2 id="c6"><span class="small"><i>Seven Pines</i> (<i>Fair Oaks</i>)</span></h2>
<p>Slowed by the heavy rains and the bad condition of the roads, where
“teams cannot haul over half a load, and often empty wagons are
stalled,” McClellan finally established his base of supply at White
House on May 15. Five days later his advance crossed the Chickahominy
River at Bottoms Bridge. By the 24th the five Federal
corps were established on a front partly encircling Richmond on the
north and east, and less than 6 miles away. Three corps lined the
<span class="pb" id="Page_7">7</span>
north bank of the Chickahominy, while the two corps under Generals
E. D. Keyes and Samuel P. Heintzelman were south of the
river, astride the York River Railroad and the roads down the
peninsula.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig8"> <ANTIMG src="images/p07a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="448" height-obs="500" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Gen. George B. McClellan.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<p>With his army thus split by the Chickahominy, McClellan realized
his position was precarious, but his orders were explicit: “General
McDowell has been ordered to march upon Richmond by the shortest
route. He is ordered * * * so to operate as to place his left
wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed
to cooperate, by extending your right wing to the north of
Richmond * * *.”</p>
<p>Then, because of Gen. Thomas J. (“Stonewall”) Jackson’s brilliant
operations in the Shenandoah Valley threatening Washington, Lincoln
telegraphed McClellan on May 24: “I have been compelled to
suspend McDowell’s movements to join you.” McDowell wrote
disgustedly: “If the enemy can succeed so readily in disconcerting
all our plans by alarming us first at one point then at another, he
will paralyze a large force with a very small one.” That is exactly
what Jackson succeeded in doing. This fear for the safety of Washington—the
skeleton that haunted Lincoln’s closet—was the dominating
factor in the military planning in the east throughout the
war.</p>
<p>Lincoln’s order only suspended McDowell’s instructions to join
McClellan; it did not revoke them. McClellan was still obliged to
keep his right wing across the swollen Chickahominy.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_8">8</div>
<p>Learning of McDowell’s withdrawal, Johnston decided to attack
the two Federal corps south of the river, drive them back and destroy
the Richmond and York River Railroad to White House.
Early in the morning on May 31, after a violent rainstorm that
threatened to wash all the Federal bridges into the river, Johnston
fell upon Keyes and Heintzelman with 23 of his 27 brigades at
Seven Pines.</p>
<p>The initial attack was sudden and vicious. Confederate Gen.
James Longstreet threw Gen. D. H. Hill’s troops against Gen. Silas
Casey’s division of Keyes’ corps, stationed about three-quarters of a
mile west of Seven Pines. Longstreet overwhelmed the Federal division,
forcing Casey to retreat a mile east of Seven Pines. Keyes then
put Gen. D. N. Couch’s division on a line from Seven Pines to Fair
Oaks, with Gen. Philip Kearney’s division on his left flank. Not
until 4 that afternoon, however, did Confederate Gen. G. W. Smith
send Whiting’s division against Couch’s right flank at Fair Oaks.
The delay was fatal. Although Couch was forced back slowly, he
drew up a new line of battle facing south towards Fair Oaks, with
his back to the Chickahominy River. Here he held until Gen. Edwin
V. Sumner, by heroic effort, succeeded in getting Gen. John Sedgwick’s
division and part of Gen. I. B. Richardson’s across the tottering
Grapevine Bridge to support him. Led by Sumner himself,
Sedgwick’s troops repulsed Smith’s attack and drove the Confederates
back with heavy losses.</p>
<p>The battle plan had been sound, but the attack was badly
bungled. Directed by vague, verbal orders instead of explicit,
written ones, whole brigades got lost, took the wrong roads, and
generally got in each other’s way. Nine of the 23 attacking brigades
never actually got into the fight at all. Towards nightfall
Johnston was severely wounded in the chest and borne from the field.
The command then fell to G. W. Smith. Fighting ceased with
darkness.</p>
<p>Early next morning, June 1, Smith renewed the attack. His plan
called for Whiting on the left flank to hold defensively, while Longstreet
on the right swung counterclockwise in a pivot movement to
hit Richardson’s division, which was facing south with its right near
Fair Oaks. The Federal troops repulsed the assault, however, and
when Heintzelman sent Gen. Joseph Hooker’s division on the Federal
left on the offensive, the Confederates withdrew and the battle was
over before noon.</p>
<p>That afternoon President Jefferson Davis appointed his chief military
advisor, Gen. Robert E. Lee, as commander of the Southern
forces. Lee promptly named his new command the Army of Northern
Virginia—a name destined for fame in the annals of the Civil
War.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_9">9</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig9"> <ANTIMG src="images/p08.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="513" /> <p class="pcap"><i>McClellan’s troops repairing Grapevine Bridge.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<p>Although the battle itself was indecisive, the casualties were heavy
on both sides. The Confederates lost 6,184 in killed, wounded, and
missing; the Federals, 5,031. Undoubtedly the most important result
of the fight was the wounding of Johnston and the resultant
appointment of Lee as field commander.</p>
<h2 id="c7"><span class="small"><i>Lee Takes Command</i></span></h2>
<p>Lee immediately began to reorganize the demoralized Southern forces,
and put them to work digging the elaborate system of entrenchments
that would eventually encircle Richmond completely. For
this the troops derisively named him the “King of Spades.” But
Lee was planning more than a static defense. When the time came
these fortifications could be held by a relatively small number of
troops, while he massed the bulk of his forces for a counteroffensive.
He was familiar with and believed in Napoleon’s maxim:
“* * * to manoeuver incessantly, without submitting to be driven
back on the capital which it is meant to defend * * *.”</p>
<p>On June 12 Lee sent his cavalry commander, Gen. J. E. B. (“Jeb”)
Stuart, with 1,200 men, to reconnoiter McClellan’s right flank north
<span class="pb" id="Page_10">10</span>
of the Chickahominy, and to learn the strength of his line of communication
and supply to White House. Stuart obtained the information,
but instead of retiring from White House the way he had
gone, he rode around the Union army and returned to Richmond
on June 15 by way of the James River, losing only one man in the
process.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig10"> <ANTIMG src="images/p09.jpg" alt="" width-obs="406" height-obs="500" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Gen. Robert E. Lee.</i> Courtesy, National Archives.</p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig11"> <ANTIMG src="images/p09a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="487" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Lee’s fortifications east of Mechanicsville Turnpike.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_11">11</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig12"> <ANTIMG src="images/p09c.jpg" alt="" width-obs="700" height-obs="714" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Chickahominy swamps.</i> Courtesy, National Archives.</p> </div>
<p>It was a bold feat, and Stuart assured his chief that there was nothing
to prevent his turning the Federal right flank. But the daring
ride probably helped McClellan more than Lee. Alerted to the
exposed position of his right flank and base of supply, McClellan
withdrew his whole army south of the Chickahominy, with the exception
of Gen. Fitz-John Porter’s corps, which stretched from Grapevine
Bridge to the Meadow Bridge west of Mechanicsville. On
June 18 he started the transfer of his enormous accumulation of
supplies with the shipment of 800,000 rations from White House
to Harrison’s Landing on the James River. After Jackson’s success
in the Shenandoah Valley at Cross Keys and Port Republic, it was
becoming apparent even to McClellan that McDowell probably never
would join him, in which case he wanted his base of operations to
be the James rather than the York River.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_12">12</div>
<p>Meanwhile, pressure from Washington for an offensive movement
against Richmond was mounting. But because of the wettest June
in anyone’s memory, McClellan was having trouble bringing up his
heavy siege guns, corduroying roads, and throwing bridges across
the flooded Chickahominy swamps. As one bedraggled soldier wrote:
“It would have pleased us much to have seen those ‘On-to-Richmond’
people put over a 5 mile course in the Virginia mud, loaded
with a 40-pound knapsack, 60 rounds of cartridges, and haversacks
filled with 4 days rations.”</p>
<p>Also, McClellan believed erroneously that the Confederates had
twice as many available troops as he had. Consequently, his plan
of action, as he wrote his wife, was to “make the first battle mainly an
artillery combat. As soon as I gain possession of the ‘Old Tavern’
I will push them in upon Richmond and behind their works; then
I will bring up my heavy guns, shell the city, and carry it by assault.”</p>
<h2 id="c8"><span class="small"><i>The Seven Days Begins</i></span></h2>
<div class="fig"> id="fig13"> <ANTIMG src="images/p10.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="558" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Lee’s plan of attack.</i> Painting by Sidney King.</p> </div>
<p>McClellan’s plan probably would have succeeded had Lee been willing
to stand still for it. But the Confederate commander did not
intend to let McClellan fight that type of warfare. As he wrote to
Jackson: “Unless McClellan can be driven out of his entrenchments
he will move by positions under cover of his heavy guns within
<span class="pb" id="Page_13">13</span>
shelling distance of Richmond.” It was almost as if Lee had read
McClellan’s letter to his wife.</p>
<p>Lee’s plan to drive McClellan away from Richmond was bold and
daring, and strategically brilliant. He would bring Jackson’s forces
down from the valley quickly and secretly to turn McClellan’s right
flank at Mechanicsville. At the same time Gen. A. P. Hill’s division
would cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, turn east
and clear the Federal forces from Mechanicsville, thereby opening
the Mechanicsville Turnpike bridge for D. H. Hill and Longstreet’s
troops to cross. Then, in echelon, the four divisions would sweep
down the north side of the Chickahominy, annihilate Porter’s corps,
capture the supply base at White House, then turn and destroy the
rest of the Union army. With Jackson’s forces and other reinforcements
from farther south, Lee would have about 90,000 men, the
largest army he would ever command in the field.</p>
<p>To protect Richmond, he planned to leave about one-third of his
army, under Generals John B. Magruder and Benjamin Huger, in
the entrenchments around the city to hold back the main part of
McClellan’s force, about 70,000 men, from marching into the Confederate
Capital. If this force started to withdraw, then Magruder
and Huger would attack.</p>
<p>Lee apparently believed that McClellan would try to retreat to his
base at White House, or failing that, would retire back down the
peninsula. He assured Jefferson Davis that “any advance of the
enemy toward Richmond will be prevented by vigorously following
his rear and crippling and arresting his progress.” The strategy was
just about perfect, but, unfortunately for Lee, the tactics were not.</p>
<p>On the morning of June 25 the Seven Days began with the advance
of Hooker’s division along the Williamsburg road at Oak
Grove, preparatory to a general advance McClellan planned for the
next day. But Hooker ran into strong opposition from Huger’s
troops, and when McClellan received intelligence of Jackson’s approach,
Hooker was ordered back. McClellan wired Washington:
“I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear.” He
had delayed too long—the next day Lee wrested the initiative from
him.</p>
<h2 id="c9"><span class="small"><i>Beaver Dam Creek</i> (<i>Ellerson’s Mill</i>)</span></h2>
<p>According to Lee’s plan, Jackson was to march from Ashland
on June 25 and encamp that night just west of the Central Railroad.
At 3 a.m. on the 26th he was to advance and envelop Porter’s
right flank at Beaver Dam Creek. Then, wrote Lee, “A. P. Hill
was to cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge when Jackson’s
<span class="pb" id="Page_14">14</span>
advance beyond that point should be known and move directly upon
Mechanicsville.”</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig14"> <ANTIMG src="images/p11.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="493" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Confederate attack at Beaver Dam Creek.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<p>But from the beginning, unforeseen circumstances upset the operation
and timing of this plan. McClellan suspected Jackson’s approach,
so the element of surprise was lacking. And when the action of
the Union pickets in destroying bridges and felling trees in Jackson’s
path, as well as the fatigue of his weary troops, combined to
delay him, the all-important time element was lost.</p>
<p>As the day wore on with no word from Jackson, A. P. Hill became
impatient and fearful for the success of Lee’s plan. He decided
to attack regardless. At 3 that afternoon he crossed the Chickahominy
and swept the Union outposts from Mechanicsville, thus clearing
the way for D. H. Hill and Longstreet’s troops to cross. Porter
withdrew to a prepared position behind Beaver Dam Creek, a mile
east of Mechanicsville. This naturally strong position was further
fortified by felled trees and the banks of a millrace. Here, atop the high
banks of the stream, he placed Gen. George McCall’s division, extending
from near the Chickahominy on the south, across Old Church
road (now U.S. 360) on the north. Gen. Truman Seymour’s brigade
held the left and Gen. John Reynold’s the right, with Gen. George G.
Meade’s brigade in reserve. The only approaches to the position
were across open fields, commanded by the Federal artillery, and down
the steep banks of the stream, covered by the soldiers’ muskets.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_15">15</div>
<p>Hill recklessly hurled his brigades forward in a hopeless frontal
assault. The gray-clad infantry charged bravely down the steep banks
and up to the stream before the murderous fire of artillery and
musketry from the surrounding slopes forced a bloody withdrawal.
Casualties in killed and wounded were: Confederate 1,485; Union, 258.</p>
<p>Despite the successful defense, when Jackson’s forces finally appeared
on his right flank later that night, Porter’s position became untenable
and McClellan ordered him to withdraw to a previously prepared
position behind Boatswain Swamp, near Gaines’ Mill. At
the same time he ordered his quartermaster general at White House
to reship all the supplies he possibly could to Harrison’s Landing
on the James, and send all the beef cattle to the vicinity of Savage
Station. Early next morning, June 27, the herd of 2,500 head of
cattle started on its drive from White House.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig15"> <ANTIMG src="images/p11a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="700" height-obs="740" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Battle of Gaines’ Mill.</i> From <i>Battles and Leaders of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<dl class="undent pcap"><br/>OLD COLD HARBOR
<br/>Gaines’s MILL
<br/>NEW COLD HARBOR
<br/><i>CONFEDERATE</i>
<br/>Lee’s Headq’rs
<br/>D. H. HILL
<br/>JACKSON
<dd class="t">EWELL
<br/>A. P. HILL
<dd class="t">WHITING
<br/>LONGSTREET
<br/><i>UNION</i>
<br/>SYKES
<dd class="t">McGehee
<dd class="t">BUCHANAN
<dd class="t">WARREN
<dd class="t">LOVELL
<br/>MORELL
<dd class="t">Porter’s Headq’rs
<dd class="t">GRIFFIN
<dd class="t">MARTINDALE
<dd class="t">BUTTERFIELD
<br/>McCALL
<dd class="t">REYNOLDS
<dd class="t">SEYMOUR
<dd class="t">MEADE
<br/>J. Martin
<br/>W. F. SMITH
<br/>SLOCUM <i>ARRIVING 4 O’CLOCK</i>
<dd class="t">NEWTON
<dd class="t">TAYLOR
<dd class="t">BARTLETT
<br/>FRENCH & MEACHER <i>ARRIVING TO COVER RETREAT about 6.30 p.m.</i>
<div class="pb" id="Page_16">16</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig16"> <ANTIMG src="images/p12.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="557" /> <p class="pcap"><i>McClellan’s change of base.</i> Painting by Sidney King.</p> </div>
<dl class="undent pcap"><br/>WHITE HOUSE
<br/>MECHANICSVILLE
<br/>GAINES MILL
<br/>Pomunkey
<br/>SAVAGE STATION
<br/>Chickahominy
<br/>GLENDALE
<br/>MALVERN HILL
<br/>HARRISON’S LANDING
<h2 id="c10"><span class="small"><i>Gaines’ Mill</i></span></h2>
<p>The tactical situation was now extremely critical for both Lee and
McClellan. Because of the repulse at Beaver Dam, Lee had not yet
achieved his first objective, which, according to his battle order, was
to “drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge,” about 4
miles east of Mechanicsville. Lee’s whole plan for the defense of
Richmond, in the event McClellan should elect to march on the city
with his main force south of the Chickahominy, hinged on his ability
to cross the river quickly and attack the Federal rear. Lacking
control of New Bridge this would be impossible. Although the
Union position behind Boatswain Swamp was actually east of New
Bridge, the approaches to the bridge could be covered by Porter’s
artillery.</p>
<p>The situation was equally serious for McClellan. With Jackson
enveloping his right flank and rear, and believing he “had to deal
with at least double” his numbers, White House would have to be
abandoned. Having made the decision to change his base to the
James, he desperately needed time to perfect the arrangements and
to get the thousands of wagons and the herd of cattle safely started.
His order to Porter was explicit, “hold our position at any cost
until night * * *.”</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_17">17</div>
<p>Porter’s corps now occupied a semicircular line of battle along the
crest of the partially wooded plateau behind Boatswain Swamp, with
both extremes resting on the Chickahominy River. It was another
naturally strong position further strengthened by felling trees and
digging rifle pits. The approaches to the position were over an
open plain and across a sharp ravine. Gen. George Morell’s division
held the left and Gen. George Sykes’ right, with McCall’s weary
troops in reserve. Gen. Philip St. George Cooke’s cavalry was on
Porter’s extreme left, in the lowlands bordering the Chickahominy.
During the course of the impending battle of Gaines’ Mill, Porter
would be reinforced by Gen. Willard Slocum’s division, giving him
a total strength of about 35,000, as opposed to about 60,000 for Lee.</p>
<p>On the Confederate side, Longstreet was on Lee’s right opposite
Morell, A. P. Hill in the center, and Jackson and D. H. Hill on
the left. Lee was convinced that the greater part of the Federal
army was in his front, and he still thought McClellan would try to
protect his base and retreat toward White House. On these erroneous
assumptions he made his plans.</p>
<p>A. P. Hill would attack the center while Longstreet made a feint
on the Union left. Then when Jackson appeared on the Union
right, Lee believed Porter would shift part of his troops to meet
Jackson’s threat in order to keep him from getting between the
Union army and its base at White House. As soon as Porter did
this, Longstreet would turn the feint into a full assault, and together
with Hill drive the Union forces into Jackson and D. H. Hill, waiting
on Lee’s left.</p>
<p>About 2:30 p.m. Hill attacked the center of the Federal line, but
under a devastating fire of artillery and musketry, “where men fell
like leaves in an autumn wind,” his troops were hurled back with
heavy losses. Longstreet, realizing a feint now would not help Hill,
ordered a full-scale attack, but he too suffered a bloody repulse.
Jackson, sensing that “Porter didn’t drive worth two cents,” as he
quaintly put it, threw D. H. Hill against Sykes on Porter’s right.</p>
<p>By now A. P. Hill’s division was badly cut up, and on Lee’s request
Jackson sent Whiting’s division, consisting of Gen. E. M.
Law’s and John B. Hood’s brigades, over to support him. Porter
then threw in Slocum’s division of Franklin’s corps, to protect
threatened points along the line. The vicious battle waged furiously
for 4 hours. “The noise of the musketry,” said one veteran, “was
not rattling, as ordinarily, but one intense metallic din.”</p>
<p>Finally, just as darkness covered the bloody field, Hood’s Texas
brigade, along with Gen. George Pickett’s brigade on Longstreet’s
left, penetrated the right of Morell’s line in a courageous bayonet
charge that broke the morale of the Federal troops. They went
streaming back across the plateau to the safety of the Chickahominy
<span class="pb" id="Page_18">18</span>
River. In a last desperate attempt to stem the tide, General Cooke
(“Jeb” Stuart’s father-in-law) sent his cavalry in a wild charge against
the pressing Confederates. But the retreating Union infantry and
artillery obstructed the cavalry and broke its attack. The only result
was the loss of several more artillery pieces in the confusion.</p>
<p>With darkness closing in and the Confederate troops disorganized
after the breakthrough, Lee did not attempt to pursue the Federals
farther. Porter withdrew the remnants of his corps across the river
and rejoined the main Union army. Total casualties in this crucial
battle, the most costly and vicious of the Seven Days, were: Union,
6,837; Confederate, 8,751.</p>
<p>In a sense, both sides had achieved their immediate objectives.
Porter had held until night, so McClellan could get his army safely
started for Harrison’s Landing. Lee had cleared the north side of
the Chickahominy of all Federal forces, broken their supply line to
White House, controlled strategic New Bridge, and had turned back
McClellan’s advance on Richmond.</p>
<h2 id="c11"><span class="small"><i>Savage Station</i></span></h2>
<div class="fig"> id="fig17"> <ANTIMG src="images/p13.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="545" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Battle of Savage Station.</i> From <i>Battles and Leaders of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<dl class="undent pcap"><br/>MAGRUDER’S HEADQUARTERS ON BRIDGE OVER RAILROAD
<br/>TOOMB’S BRIGADE
<br/>BARKSDALE’S BRIGADE
<br/>COBB’S BRIGADE
<br/>HART’S BATTERY
<br/>RAILROAD BATTERY
<br/>KERSHAW’S BRIGADE
<br/>SEMMES’S BRIG.
<br/>KEMPER’S BATTERY
<br/>17<sup>TH.</sup> & 21<sup>ST.</sup> MISS. OF BARKESDALE’S BRIG.
<dl class="undent pcap"><br/>RICHARDSON’S DIVISION
<br/>SUMNER’S CORPS
<dd class="t">MEAGHER
<dd class="t">CALDWELL
<dd class="t">FRENCH
<br/>FIELD HOSPITAL
<br/>SEDGWICK’S DIVISION
<br/>BURN’S BRIG.
<br/>GORMAN
<dd class="t">1ST-MINN. GORMAN’S BRIG.
<br/>DANA
<br/>PETTIT, HAZZARD AND OSBORN
<br/>SUMNER & FRANKLIN <i>HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD</i>
<br/>HANCOCK’S BRIGADE, SMITH’S DIVISION, FRANKLIN’S CORPS
<br/>CENTER’S BATTERY
<br/>BROOKS’S BRIG., SMITH’S DIV., FRANKLIN’S CORPS
<br/>DAVIDSON’S BRIGADE
<p>McClellan was now engaged in the most difficult move an army can
be called upon to make in the face of an aggressive enemy—a flanking
movement to effect a change of base. There was no thought
<span class="pb" id="Page_19">19</span>
given to any offensive movement. President Lincoln telegraphed:
“Save your army at all events.” This was now McClellan’s only
objective.</p>
<p>That McClellan had not tried to fall back on White House surprised
Lee, as he had believed he was facing the main part of the
Federal army at Gaines’ Mill. The next day, June 28, he spent
burying the dead, reorganizing for another offensive movement, and
attempting to divine McClellan’s plans. Lee reported to Jefferson
Davis that “the bridges over the Chickahominy in rear of the enemy
were destroyed, and their reconstruction impracticable in the presence
of his whole army and powerful batteries. We were therefore compelled
to wait until his purpose should be developed.” By nightfall,
however, he realized that McClellan was headed for the James
River, and made his plans accordingly.</p>
<p>Early next morning, June 29, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were to
cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge and take the Darbytown
road to where it met the Long Bridge road. Huger and Magruder,
already on the south side of the river in front of Richmond, were
ordered in pursuit of the Federal forces—Huger by Charles City road
and Magruder by the Williamsburg road. In the meantime, Jackson
would cross Grapevine Bridge and sweep down the south side
of the river to get in McClellan’s rear.</p>
<p>Again, Lee’s strategy was brilliant. The Charles City road met
the Long Bridge road at a place called Glendale or Frayser’s Farm.
Lee planned to have all his divisions converge there at about the
time the middle of McClellan’s long column should be passing.
The impact of the expected blow would undoubtedly split the Union
army, and with Jackson’s corps in the rear of one half, the other
half could be cut off and annihilated. Once again, however, the staff
work and tactics were pitiful.</p>
<p>McClellan’s rearguard was posted about Savage Station on the
Richmond and York River Railroad, facing west. Richardson’s division,
of Sumner’s corps, was in an open field north of the railroad
tracks in back of the station. Sedgwick’s division held the
center in another open field south of the tracks, with its left resting
on the Williamsburg road. Gen. William F. (“Baldy”) Smith’s
division, of Franklin’s corps, took position in the woods south of
the Williamsburg road.</p>
<p>Magruder reached the vicinity of Savage Station about noon, June
29, but did not attack as he realized his four brigades were badly
outnumbered. He halted and waited for Jackson, who was supposed
to turn the Federal right flank along the Chickahominy and get in
their rear. But Jackson “was delayed by the necessity of reconstructing
Grapevine Bridge.” Magruder then mistakenly reported McClellan
advancing and sent for two brigades from Huger to support
<span class="pb" id="Page_20">20</span>
him. Lee cancelled the order when he realized that what Magruder
had hit was only the rearguard covering the Federal army’s passage
across White Oak swamp. What Lee did not realize, however,
was that Jackson was not in position and would not reach Savage
Station until 3 the following morning. Finally, about 5 that afternoon,
Magruder attacked with his four brigades and two regiments,
but it was too late with too little. The Federals withdrew hastily
but safely. In their haste they were forced to leave 2,500 sick and
wounded men in the field hospital at Savage Station and to abandon
or destroy a vast amount of supplies and equipment.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig18"> <ANTIMG src="images/p14.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="682" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Battle of Savage Station.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_21">21</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig19"> <ANTIMG src="images/p14a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="700" height-obs="627" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Battle of Glendale.</i> From <i>Battles and Leaders of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<dl class="undent pcap"><br/><i>CONFEDERATE</i>
<br/>JACKSON’S CORPS & D. H. HILL
<br/>HUGER
<br/>LONGSTREET
<br/>A. P. HILL
<br/><i>UNION</i>
<br/>SMITH
<br/>RICHARDSON
<br/>1 REG<sup>T.</sup>, 1 GUN
<br/>SLOCUM
<br/>KEARNY
<br/>McCALL
<br/>SEDGWICK
<br/>HOOKER
<br/>
<h2 id="c12"><span class="small"><i>Glendale (Frayser’s Farm)</i></span></h2>
<p>Lee now ordered Magruder to follow Longstreet and A. P. Hill down
the Darbytown road. The next day, June 30, Longstreet and Hill
came upon the Union troops of McCall and Kearney across the Long
Bridge road about a mile west of the Charles City road intersection
at Glendale. Hooker held the left or south flank, with Slocum on
the right guarding the Charles City road approach. Sedgwick was
in the rear in reserve. Longstreet and Hill halted and waited for
Huger, coming down the Charles City road, and Jackson, supposedly
coming on the Federal rear from White Oak Swamp.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Gen. T. H. Holmes, who had come from the south
side of the James River with part of his division and Gen. Henry
A. Wise’s brigade, had been sent by Lee down the River, or New
Market road in an attempt to get between McClellan and the James
River. McClellan anticipated the move, however, and Warren of
Sykes’ division stopped Holmes south of Malvern Hill. Lee then
<span class="pb" id="Page_22">22</span>
ordered Magruder on the Darbytown road to reinforce him, but
Magruder’s forces did not get there in time to help.</p>
<p>Huger was delayed by obstructions, mostly felled trees, with which
the Federals had blocked his path. Instead of going around the
obstructions, Huger continually halted to clear the road. Thus it
resolved itself into a question of whether Huger could clear the
trees as fast as the Union soldiers cut them down. In this so-called
“battle of the axes” Huger lost, and did not get to Glendale in
time to participate in the engagement.</p>
<p>About 4 that afternoon, however, Longstreet heard artillery firing
from Huger’s direction which “was supposed to indicate his approach,”
and expecting Jackson’s appearance momentarily, he opened
with one of his batteries and thus brought on the battle. Jackson
never did show up, being held north of White Oak Swamp by the
artillery of Richardson and Smith, and did not get to Glendale until
the next day. The fight was particularly vicious with many pockets
of hand-to-hand combat, but, without the expected support of Huger
and Jackson, Longstreet could not break the Union lines in time to
inflict any serious damage or to interrupt the withdrawal. Lee stated
in his report: “Could the other commands have cooperated in the
action the result would have proved most disastrous to the enemy.”
Gone was Lee’s last chance to cut McClellan’s army in two.</p>
<h2 id="c13"><span class="small"><i>Malvern Hill</i></span></h2>
<p>McClellan had already selected another naturally strong position, this
time on Malvern Hill, for the last stand before reaching the James
River. On the morning of July 1, Morell and Sykes’ divisions of
Porter’s corps were drawn up on the crest of the hill west of the
Quaker road. East of the road Couch’s division of Keyes’ corps
held the front, with Kearney and Hooker of Heintzelman’s corps
flanked to the right and rear. Sumner’s troops were in the rear in
reserve. The position was flanked on either side by creeks in deep
ravines less than a mile apart, and across this narrow front, Porter
placed his batteries with the guns almost hub to hub. In front,
the ground was open, sloping down to woods, marshes, and swamps,
through which the Confederate forces had to form for attack within
range of the Federal artillery.</p>
<p>Lee had Jackson on his left facing Kearney, Hooker, and Couch’s
right. D. H. Hill was in the center opposite Couch’s left and Morell’s
right. Lee then ordered Magruder to the right of Hill, but
Magruder was delayed by taking the wrong road; so instead two
brigades of Huger’s were placed on Hill’s right. Longstreet and
A. P. Hill, their ranks decimated from the actions at Gaines’ Mill
and Glendale, were held in reserve. The terrain rendered it almost
impossible for effective use of Confederate artillery, and the few batteries
that did get into position were quickly cut to pieces by the
massed Union guns.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_23">23</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig20"> <ANTIMG src="images/p15.jpg" alt="" width-obs="671" height-obs="1000" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Battle of Malvern Hill.</i> From <i>Battles and Leaders of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<dl class="undent pcap"><br/><i>Confederate Forces</i>
<br/>LONGSTREET’S DIVISIONS
<br/>FIELD OF A. P. HILL
<br/>THOMAS OF A. P. HILL
<br/>BRANCH OF A. P. HILL
<br/>COBB OF MAGRUDER
<br/>G. T. ANDERSON OF MAGRUDER
<br/>RANSOM OF HUGER
<br/>JONES OF JACKSON
<br/>WINDER OF JACKSON
<br/>LAWTON
<br/>EARLY OF EWELL
<br/>MAHONE OF HUGER
<br/>SEMMES OF MAGRUDER
<br/>KERSHAW OF MAGRUDER
<br/>BARKDALE OF MAGRUDER
<br/>TOOMBS OF MAGRUDER
<br/>TAYLOR OF EWELL
<br/>HAMPTON OF JACKSON
<br/>LAW OF WHITING
<br/>TRIMBLE OF EWELL
<br/>WRIGHT OF HUGER
<br/>ARMISTEAD OF HUGER
<br/>GORDON OF HUGER
<br/>OF D. H. HILL:
<dd class="t">E. B. ANDERSON
<dd class="t">RIPLEY
<dd class="t">GARLAND
<dd class="t">COLQUITT
<br/>HOOD OF WHITING
<br/>HOLMES’ DIVISION
<br/><i>Union Forces</i>
<br/>BERDAN’S SHARPSHOOTERS
<br/>MEAGHER <i>after dark</i>
<br/>QUAKER
<br/>PALMER
<br/>ABERCROMBIE
<br/>HOWE
<br/>J. W. Binford
<br/>GRIFFIN
<br/>McQUADE
<br/>MORELL
<dd class="t">Crew
<dd class="t">West
<br/>CALDWELL
<br/>NICKLES OF HOOKER
<br/>KEARNY
<br/>HOOKER
<br/>HEINTZELMAN’S CORPS
<br/>FRANKLIN
<br/>SUMNER’S CORPS
<br/>Binford
<br/>BUCHANAN
<br/>MARTINDALE
<br/>BUTTERFIELD
<br/>LOVELL
<br/>SYKES
<br/>HOLMES’ DIVISION
<br/>RESERVE BATTERIES
<br/>WARREN OF SYKES
<br/>Malvern House <i>HEADQUARTERS OF GEN. PORTER</i>
<br/>SEYMOUR OF McCALL
<br/>Greenwood <i>(HOSPITAL)</i>
<br/>GUN-BOAT FIRE FROM JAMES RIVER
<div class="pb" id="Page_24">24</div>
<p>“Owing to ignorance of the country, the dense forests impeding
necessary communications, and the extreme difficulty of the
ground,” Lee reported, “the whole line was not formed until a late
hour in the afternoon.” The first real assault did not take place
until after 5, and then it was uncoordinated and confused. The signal
for the attack was to be a yell from one of Huger’s brigades,
after the Confederate artillery had blasted a hole in the Union lines.
This put the responsibility of where and when to begin the attack
on a mere brigade commander.</p>
<p>The artillery was unable to put concentrated fire in any one spot,
but Huger attacked regardless and was beaten back with heavy losses.
Then D. H. Hill attacked, only to suffer the same fate. Magruder
finally sent his troops in a gallant charge across the open fields
right up to the cannons’ muzzles, only to be mowed down like wheat
at harvest time. Late in the battle Jackson sent his own division
to Magruder’s and Hill’s support, but in the heavily wooded and
swampy ground they got lost and did not arrive in time to help.
Darkness finally put an end to these hopeless attacks. As D. H. Hill
declared bitterly, “It was not war—it was murder.”</p>
<h2 id="c14"><span class="small"><i>End of Campaign</i></span></h2>
<div class="fig"> id="fig21"> <ANTIMG src="images/p16.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="450" /> <p class="pcap"><i>McClellan’s withdrawal.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<p>During the night McClellan continued his withdrawal, and the next
day found the Army of the Potomac safe at Harrison’s Landing
<span class="pb" id="Page_25">25</span>
under the protection of the Federal gunboats on the James. The
Seven Days were over. Total casualties: Army of Northern Virginia,
20,614; Army of the Potomac, 15,849.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig22"> <ANTIMG src="images/p16a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="530" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Army of the Potomac at Harrison’s Landing.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<p>In his official report of the campaign Lee stated: “Under ordinary
circumstances the Federal Army should have been destroyed. Its
escape was due to * * * the want of correct and timely information.
This fact, attributable chiefly to the character of the country,
enabled Gen. McClellan skillfully to conceal his retreat and to add
much to the obstructions with which nature had beset the way of
our pursuing columns * * *.” But his other objective had been
achieved—Richmond was safe, at least for the time being.</p>
<p>While McClellan had successfully changed his base of operations
from the York to the James River and saved his army in the process,
he had failed in his first objective of capturing Richmond and possibly
ending the war. The decision to remove the army from the
peninsula, rather than reinforce it for another attempt on Richmond,
was made in Washington over McClellan’s strong objections. He
wrote to Gen. Henry W. Halleck: “It is here on the banks of the
James, that the fate of the Union should be decided.”</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_26">26</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig23"> <ANTIMG src="images/p17.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="574" /> <p class="pcap"><i>McClellan’s cartographers.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<p>Although McClellan wisely realized the advantages of another
assault on Richmond on the line of the James, it was his own mistaken
view of Lee’s strength that was the major reason for the withdrawal.
As Halleck explained to him:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You and your officers at one interview estimated the enemy’s forces
in and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then you and others
report that they have received and are receiving large re-enforcements
from the South. General Pope’s army covering Washington is only
about 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are 30
miles from Richmond, and General Pope 80 or 90, with the enemy
directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon
one or the other, as he may elect. Neither can re-enforce the other in
case of such an attack. If General Pope’s army be diminished to re-enforce
you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left
uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope,
you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy
should the enemy turn around and attack you in full force. In other
words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts * * * and
I wish to unite them.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In August the Army of the Potomac was transported by water
back to Washington to support Pope’s campaign in Northern Virginia.
McClellan’s failure to capture the Confederate Capital, combined
with Lee’s failure to destroy the Union Army, assured the nation
a long, bitter war that became one of the great turning points in
American history.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_27">27</div>
<h2 id="c15"><span class="small"><i>The Years Between</i></span></h2>
<div class="fig"> id="fig24"> <ANTIMG src="images/p17a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="468" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Richmond, summer of 1862.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<p>In August 1862 Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis: “If we are able to
change the theater of the war from the James River to the north
of the Rappahannock we shall be able to consume provisions and
forage now being used in supporting the enemy.” So Lee moved
into Northern Virginia to meet Pope’s threatened overland campaign
against Richmond. At Second Manassas (Bull Run) the Union
army was defeated again and withdrew into the fortifications around
Washington.</p>
<p>Lee took advantage of this opportunity and made his first invasion
north into Maryland, only to be defeated by McClellan at Antietam
(Sharpsburg) in September. Lee then withdrew into Virginia,
and at Fredericksburg in December he severely repulsed Gen.
Ambrose Burnside’s move on Richmond. In the spring of 1863 the
Union army, now under Hooker, attempted to flank Lee’s left and
rear to cut him off from Richmond, but it was decisively defeated
at Chancellorsville and driven back across the Rapidan. Lee then
made his second thrust north, penetrating into Pennsylvania, but
was beaten back by Meade at Gettysburg in the summer of 1863
and, once again, retired into Virginia.</p>
<p>These gallant armies fought each other across the fields of Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and Virginia before they clashed again in the
outskirts of Richmond 2 years later.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_28">28</div>
<h2 class="center"><span class="sc">Part Two</span> <br/>THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR RICHMOND, 1864-65</h2>
<h2 id="c16"><span class="small"><i>Lincoln’s New Commander</i></span></h2>
<p>In March 1864 President Lincoln appointed Gen. Ulysses S. Grant
as commanding general of all the Union armies. Said Grant: “In
the east the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations
toward each other as three years before, or when the war
began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate Capitals.
Battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known
in war * * * from the James River to Gettysburg, with indecisive
results.” He hoped to change this situation by putting pressure on
all Confederate armies at the same time, something that had never
been done before.</p>
<p>Grant’s plan called for Gen. Benjamin F. Butler to march up the
south side of the James and attack Petersburg or Richmond or both;
Gen. Franz Sigel to push down the Shenandoah Valley driving
Gen. Jubal Early before him, thereby protecting Washington; Gen.
Nathaniel Banks in New Orleans to march on Mobile; Gen. William
T. Sherman to cut across Georgia driving Johnston before him,
take Atlanta, and if necessary swing north to Richmond; Meade’s
Army of the Potomac, with Grant in command, to push Lee’s Army
of Northern Virginia and capture Richmond. As Grant stated: “Lee,
with the Capital of the Confederacy, was the main end to which all
were working.”</p>
<p>Lee’s objective now was to stop Grant and protect Richmond.
Said Lee: “We must destroy this army of Grant’s before he gets to
the James River. If he gets there it will become a siege, and then
it will be a mere question of time.”</p>
<p>The campaign started in the spring of 1864 when the Army of
the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and the Army of Northern
Virginia blocked its path at the Wilderness. After a particularly
vicious and costly battle, Grant instead of retreating to lick his
wounds as other Federal commanders had done, executed a left flank
movement, still heading south and trying to get between Lee and
Richmond. A few days later the two armies clashed again at Spotsylvania
in a series of grim battles, but still indecisive as far as
major objectives were concerned. Although Grant’s losses were staggering,
he was slowly but methodically destroying Lee’s ability to
wage offensive war.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_29">29</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig25"> <ANTIMG src="images/p18.jpg" alt="" width-obs="700" height-obs="794" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<p>Again Grant executed a left flank movement to get around Lee,
and then by a series of flanking marches, which the Confederate soldiers
called the “sidling movement,” and the Union soldiers the “jug-handle”
movement, Grant gradually worked his way down to Cold
Harbor.</p>
<h2 id="c17"><span class="small"><i>Cold Harbor</i></span></h2>
<p>Where and what was Cold Harbor? Cold Harbor was a seedy-looking
tavern, squatting by a dusty crossroads 8 miles from Richmond,
on the flat, featureless plain, intersected by hundreds of small
<span class="pb" id="Page_30">30</span>
creeks, gullies, and swamps, that is characteristic of the land between
the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy Rivers. There wasn’t
a harbor for miles and it was anything but cold. It was the only
Cold Harbor in the United States, although there were many Cold
Harbors on the stagecoach routes along the Thames River in England.
The name indicated a place to get a bed for the night and
something cold to drink, but not hot meals.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig26"> <ANTIMG src="images/p19.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="519" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Cold Harbor Tavern.</i> From a photograph taken in 1885 as it appears in <i>Battles and Leaders of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<p>But these dusty crossroads were strategically important if Grant
was to attack Richmond, and both Lee and Grant realized it. Also,
it was Grant’s last chance to continue his strategy of trying to get
between Lee and Richmond—any more flanking movements and Lee
would be in the entrenchments around the Confederate Capital
where Grant did not want to fight him. As Grant stated: “Richmond
was fortified and entrenched so perfectly that one man inside
to defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or assaulting.”</p>
<p>It is significant that Lee also did not want to fight in the entrenchments
around Richmond. There he would be on the defensive, and
in such a position could not possibly destroy Grant’s army. So both
commanders were willing for the test.</p>
<p>And what of the lowly foot-soldier, the unsung hero in the ranks,
the poor bloody infantryman? Was he ready for the awful test?</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_31">31</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig27"> <ANTIMG src="images/p19a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="492" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Confederate camp.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<p>To the average soldier, this whole campaign was fast becoming
just a series of hazy, indistinct recollections, like the fragments of
a half-forgotten dream: Long columns of sweat-soaked soldiers marching
over hills and rivers and swamps, across ploughed fields and corn
fields, down endless dusty roads through dark, lonely woods; 30
days of marching by night and fighting by day, until it must have
seemed to them that the only things left in life were stupefying
fatigue, merciless heat, choking dust, smoke and noise, mud and
blood.</p>
<p>In the Union ranks many of the men began to find out for the
first time what hunger really was. They had moved so fast and so
often the ration wagons were left far behind. Hardtack was selling
for a dollar apiece—if you could find a seller. And here at Cold
Harbor the soldiers wrote their names and regiments on pieces of
paper and pinned or sewed them to the inside of their dirty blouses,
with the forlorn hope that if and when they were killed someone
might take the time to find out who they were.</p>
<p>To Lee’s barefoot, ragged veterans, hunger had been a constant
companion for a long time, but at Cold Harbor they approached
starvation. A Confederate sergeant recorded in his diary: “When
we reached Cold Harbor the command to which I belonged had
<span class="pb" id="Page_32">32</span>
been marching almost continuously day and night for more than
fifty hours without food, and for the first time we knew what actual
starvation was.” When scurvy appeared among the men, owing
primarily to a lack of fresh vegetables, Lee advised them to eat the
roots of the sassafras and wild grape, if they could find any.</p>
<p>In the race for initial possession of the crossroads at Cold Harbor,
Lee’s cavalry won by a few hours. But in the afternoon of May 31
Gen. Philip Sheridan’s cavalry drove them out and held the crossroads
until relieved by the Federal VI Corps under Gen. Horatio
Wright. Most of Sheridan’s troopers were armed with the new
Spencer repeating carbine, which made dismounted cavalrymen
effective infantry.</p>
<p>The next morning, June 1, Lee threw Gen. Richard Anderson’s
corps (Longstreet’s old corps—Longstreet having been wounded in
the Wilderness) against the Federal VI Corps in a bold attempt to
seize the crossroads and roll up Grant’s left flank before he could
reinforce it, but Anderson was repulsed. Grant then moved the
XVIII Corps under “Baldy” Smith, which he had borrowed from
Butler’s army bottled up on the south side of the James, over to
the right of the VI Corps. That afternoon they attacked Anderson,
now supported by Gen. Robert Hoke’s division.</p>
<p>The assault failed to break the Confederate line, but it did bend
it back in several places. Grant believed that with a greater concentration
a breakthrough could be achieved. Consequently, he
ordered the II Corps under Gen. Winfield Hancock over to the left
of the VI Corps, between it and the Chickahominy River, and
planned an all out attack by the three corps for the morning of
June 2.</p>
<p>Anticipating the move, Lee put A. P. Hill, supported by Gen.
John Breckinridge’s division, over to his right between Anderson
and the Chickahominy and waited.</p>
<p>The expected attack failed to materialize, however. Hancock got
lost in the woods and swamps moving to his assigned position, and
after an all-night forced march the men were too exhausted to
mount an attack. Any chance the assault might have had for success
was now gone. The delay was fortunate for Lee because
Breckinridge also got lost and was not in position to support Hill
on the morning of June 2. The attack was then ordered for that
afternoon but again postponed until 4:30 the morning of June 5.
And each corps commander received a telegram from Grant’s headquarters
that read: “Corps Commanders will employ the interim in
making examinations of the ground in their front and perfecting
arrangements for the assault.”</p>
<p>Lee’s veterans took advantage of this fatal 24-hour delay to entrench
themselves quickly and effectively, using every creek, gully, ravine,
<span class="pb" id="Page_33">33</span>
and swamp in such fashion that all approaches to their positions
could be covered with a murderous fire. A newspaper reporter
present at Cold Harbor wrote a vivid description of those entrenchments.
“They are intricate, zig-zagged lines within lines, lines protecting
flanks of lines, lines built to enfilade opposing lines * * *
works within works and works outside works, each laid out with
some definite design.”</p>
<p>Lee needed this strong position; he would fight at Cold Harbor
without a reserve. He wrote to Jefferson Davis: “If I shorten my
lines to provide a reserve, he will turn me; if I weaken my lines
to provide a reserve, he will break them.”</p>
<p>Grant’s battle plan was relatively uncomplicated. It was, essentially,
a simple, frontal assault. Hancock’s II Corps and Wright’s
VI Corps, between the Chickahominy and the Cold Harbor road
(now State Route 156), together with Smith’s XVIII Corps north
of the road, were to attack all out and break the Confederate lines.
Gen. Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps, north of the XVIII, was to
be held in reserve, while Burnside’s IX Corps, on Grant’s extreme
right, was not to enter the fight unless Lee weakened his line in
that sector, then it would attack, supported by the V Corps. Lee
did not weaken any part of his line, so these two corps were not
engaged to any appreciable extent. Thus the battle actually took
place on approximately a 2½-mile front, although the armies stretched
for 6 miles from south to north, with the Union army facing west.
Grant’s total strength was over 100,000 men, but less than 50,000
were actually engaged in the struggle.</p>
<p>Lee now had A. P. Hill, supported by Breckinridge, on his south
flank next to the Chickahominy opposite Hancock and Wright.
Hoke’s division straddled the Cold Harbor road with Gen. Joseph
Kershaw’s division just north of Hoke, then Anderson and Gen.
Richard Ewell’s corps. Lee’s total strength consisted of less than
60,000 men, but only about half were involved in the action of
June 3.</p>
<p>It rained all night the night of June 2. Toward morning the heavy
rain died to a soft, sticky mist that held the area in clammy fingers.
The first gray streaks of dawn warned of the approach of a scorching
sun that would turn the rain-soaked plain, with its myriad
streams and swamps, into a steaming cauldron. Promptly at 4:30
the three corps jumped off to the attack, knowing nothing of the
strength of the Confederate positions they would have to face. The
corps commanders had ignored Grant’s telegraphed order of the
previous afternoon and no proper reconnaissance was made.</p>
<p>The average soldier saw little in any battle in the Civil War, and
even less at Cold Harbor because of the terrain. But as the first
yellow rays of the sun shifted the gray mists, most of the Union
<span class="pb" id="Page_34">34</span>
soldiers could see the main line of Confederate entrenchments across
the open spaces in front of them—a tracing of raw earth that had
been turned up like a huge furrow, along a line of uneven ridges,
looking empty but strangely ominous. Here and there bright
regimental colors perched insolently on the dirt hills.</p>
<p>Suddenly, it seemed, the line was dotted with black slouch hats
and glistening bayonets. Yellow sheets of flame flashed from end
to end, then disappeared in a heavy cloud of smoke. Regiment after
regiment exploded into action with a metallic roar. Gigantic crashes
of artillery split the air. Shells screamed overhead like a pack of
banshees, exploding in clouds of earth, horses, and men. The noise
roared to a crescendo with a volume of sound that left the men
dazed and confused. One veteran said it was more like a volcanic
blast than a battle.</p>
<p>It was over in less than 30 minutes, but 7,000 killed and wounded
Union soldiers were left lying in the sun between the trenches. Said
one general sadly: “In that little period more men fell bleeding as
they advanced than in any other like period of time throughout the
war.”</p>
<p>Those not already killed or wounded threw themselves on the
ground and desperately heaved up little mounds of earth in front
of them with bayonets, spoons, cups, and broken canteens. They
could neither advance nor retreat—nothing standing could live long
in that hail of lead and iron. They just dug in and stayed there.</p>
<p>A peculiar thing about the battle came to light afterwards. The
three corps commanders sent identical telegrams to Grant’s headquarters,
each accusing the other of not supporting him in the
attack. Later it was discovered what had actually happened. Hancock,
on the left, had veered to his left because of the heavy fire from
there and the peculiarities of the terrain. Wright, in the center,
had gone straight ahead. And Smith, on the right, bore off to his
right because of swamps and ravines. So the farther they advanced
the more separated they became and the more their flanks were left
open to a deadly crossfire.</p>
<p>No other major assault was attempted by either army, although
the troops stayed in the hot, filthy trenches until June 12, with
constant, nerve-wracking sharpshooting and skirmishing. From June
1 to 12 the Union losses totaled 12,700; Confederate losses are
estimated at between 1,500 and 2,000.</p>
<p>Cold Harbor proved to be Lee’s last major victory in the field,
and although it was a military zero so far as Grant was concerned,
it turned out to be one of the most important and significant battles
fought during the Civil War. The results of this battle changed
the course of the war in the east from a war of maneuver to a war
of siege. It also influenced the strategy and tactics of future wars
by showing that well-selected, well-manned entrenchments, adequately
supported by artillery, were practically impregnable to frontal assaults.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_35">35</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig28"> <ANTIMG src="images/p20.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="452" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Federal trenches at Cold Harbor.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig29"> <ANTIMG src="images/p20a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="454" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Federal coehorn mortars at Cold Harbor.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_36">36</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig30"> <ANTIMG src="images/p21.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="585" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Looking for a friend at Cold Harbor.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<p>On June 5, Grant decided to bypass Richmond, cross the James and
attack Petersburg, an important railway center 25 miles south of the
Confederate Capital. This would still keep Lee’s army pinned down,
and if successful would cut communications between Richmond and
the rest of the Confederacy.</p>
<p>On June 6 he withdrew Warren’s V Corps from the lines and
used it to secure the passages across the Chickahominy and down
to the James. On June 7 he sent Sheridan, with two divisions of
cavalry, back into the Shenandoah Valley against Early. To counter
this, Lee was forced to send Gen. Wade Hampton’s cavalry after
Sheridan, which in effect left Lee without adequate cavalry. During
the night of June 12 Grant secretly moved all the troops out of the
trenches at Cold Harbor, without Lee’s being aware of the move
until the following morning, and by June 16 the Army of the
Potomac of over 100,000 men, 5,000 wagons, 2,800 head of cattle,
and 25,000 horses and mules, were all safely across the James River.
Richmond was saved for another 10 months.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_37">37</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig31"> <ANTIMG src="images/p21a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="571" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Pontoon bridge across the James.</i> Courtesy, National Archives.</p> </div>
<h2 id="c18"><span class="small"><i>Fort Harrison</i></span></h2>
<p>In the pre-dawn darkness of September 29, Grant quietly slipped
Gen. David Birney’s X Corps and Gen. Edward Ord’s XVIII Corps
back across the James in a surprise move against the outer defenses
of Richmond. The primary purpose was to prevent Lee from re-enforcing
Early in the Shenandoah Valley. If, however, any weakness
was discovered it could be exploited fully, and it might force
Lee to weaken some part of the Petersburg line.</p>
<p>Shortly after daybreak Gen. George Stannard’s division of the
XVIII Corps successfully stormed heavily armed but badly undermanned
Fort Harrison on the Varina road. Gen. Hiram Burnham,
commanding the leading brigade, was killed in the assault and the
Union forces renamed the captured fort for him. A mile and a
half farther north, Gen. Adelbert Ames’ division of the X Corps
was repulsed in a similar attack on another fortification, Fort Gilmer,
on the New Market road.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_38">38</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig32"> <ANTIMG src="images/p22.jpg" alt="" width-obs="741" height-obs="1000" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Area of the Richmond battlefields.</i> From <i>Battles and Leaders of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_39">39</div>
<p>General Lee regarded the loss of Fort Harrison as serious enough
to demand his personal attention. The next day, with re-enforcements
rushed from Petersburg, he directed several vigorous assaults
against the fort. However, the Union forces had closed in the rear
and strengthened it, and, armed with new repeating rifles, successfully
beat back the attacks and inflected heavy losses on the Confederates.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig33"> <ANTIMG src="images/p22a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="796" height-obs="611" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Members of the 1st Connecticut Artillery at Fort Brady, 1864.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<p>The fall of Fort Harrison forced Lee to draw back that part of his
outer line and to build new entrenchments to compensate for the
loss. It also forced him to extend his line north of the James, thus
weakening his already dangerously undermanned defenses in front
of Petersburg. The Union forces, to protect their position further
and to neutralize Confederate gunboats, constructed Fort Brady a
few miles south of Fort Burnham (Harrison) on a high bluff overlooking
the James River.</p>
<p>No further serious efforts were made to enter Richmond from the
north side of the James, and the two armies faced each other in
these respective positions until Grant finally broke Lee’s lines at
Petersburg on April 1, 1865, forcing the Confederates to abandon
Richmond.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_40">40</div>
<h2 id="c19"><span class="small"><i>Richmond Falls</i></span></h2>
<p>Spring came gently to Richmond that year of 1865. The winter
had been long and hard. After a cold, wet March, Sunday, April
2, dawned mild and pleasant. The green buds on the trees and the
bright new grass put the breath of seedtime in the air; sap flowed
warm in the lilac and the magnolia. Under a rich blue sky the
people strolled leisurely to church amid the cheerful music of the
bells and the soft murmur of the James River falls.</p>
<p>In St. Paul’s Episcopal Church, at the corner of Ninth and Grace
streets, Jefferson Davis sat in the family pew listening to the sermon.
The sexton walked up the aisle and handed him a message
from General Lee.</p>
<p>“I advise that all preparation be made for leaving Richmond
tonight.”</p>
<p>Davis arose quietly and left the church, walked a block down
Ninth street to his office in the War Department and gave the necessary
orders for evacuation.</p>
<p>Late in the afternoon the official order was posted—then pandemonium
reigned. Trunks, boxes, bundles of every description were
piled on the sidewalks and in the streets. Wagons, carts, buggies,
anything that had wheels and could move, were loaded and raced
through the city to fight their way across Mayo’s Bridge in the mad
rush to cross the James and flee south.</p>
<p>A frantic mob trampled each other without mercy and jammed
the streets leading to the railroad stations, only to be turned back
by soldiers’ bayonets. The few trains that would manage to leave
were reserved for government officials, archives, the treasury, and
military personnel.</p>
<p>Early in the evening the character of the crowds began to change.
From a city of less than 38,000 before the war, Richmond now had
over 100,000 people jammed into every available nook and cranny.
They had come by the thousands to work for the various government
departments and in the munitions factories. Refugees from
the many battles fought in Virginia had poured in, as well as the
sick and wounded, followed inevitably by deserters, spies, criminals,
gamblers, speculators, and derelicts of every kind.</p>
<p>And now the cheap hotels, saloons, and gambling dens began to
empty their customers into the streets, many of them half drunk.</p>
<p>All semblance of law and order disappeared. When the guards
at the State penitentiary fled, the prisoners broke loose to roam the
city at will. The provost guard took the prisoners of war from
Libby Prison down the river to be exchanged. This left only the
Local Defense Brigade, consisting of government and munitions
workers. But most of them were required in government buildings
<span class="pb" id="Page_41">41</span>
to pack and burn records; some guarded the railroad depots, while
others were engaged in destruction assignments. The order had
been given to burn all tobacco and cotton that could not be
removed by tossing flaming balls of tar into the warehouses along
the riverfront.</p>
<p>In the meantime, Mayor Mayo and the city council had appointed
a committee in each ward to see that all liquor was destroyed, and
shortly after midnight they set to work. Casks and barrels of the
finest southern bourbons were rolled to the curbs, the tops smashed
open and left to drain.</p>
<p>Like flies around honey, the mobs swarmed and fought their way
into the streets where the whiskey flowed like water. Men, women,
and children, clawing and screaming, scooped it up with bare hands, or
used pails, cups, basins, bottles, anything that would hold the amber
liquid. They used rags on sticks dipped in whiskey for torches,
and went howling through the city in search of food and plunder
like a pack of mad wolves, looting, killing, burning.</p>
<p>The soft night sky became pink, then turned a dull red. The blaze
from the Shockhoe Warehouse at Thirteenth and Cary streets, where
10,000 hogsheads of tobacco was put to the torch, flew skyward as if
shot from a huge blowtorch. The flames quickly spread to the
Franklin Paper Mills and the Gallego Flour Mills, 10 stories high.
Higher and higher they soared, and then widened until it seemed
a red hot sea of fire would engulf the whole city.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig34"> <ANTIMG src="images/p23.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="593" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Evacuation of Richmond.</i> From a contemporary engraving</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_42">42</div>
<p>A faint hot breeze began to stir from the southeast, scattering
burning embers through the streets and alleys and houses. Powder
magazines and arsenals let go with a whooshing boom. Thousands
of bullets and shells tore through buildings and ploughed up the
streets. Shells exploded high in the smoke cascading a metal spray
over the area, followed by the rattle of bursting cartridges in one
great metallic roar. Just before daybreak a deafening explosion
from the James River signalled the destruction of the Confederate
warships and the Navy Yard.</p>
<p>Richmond was now one vast inferno of flame, noise, smoke, and
trembling earth. The roaring fire swept northwestward from the
riverfront, hungrily devouring the two railroad depots, all the banks,
flour and paper mills, and hotels, warehouses, stores, and houses by
the hundreds.</p>
<p>About dawn a large crowd gathered in front of the huge government
commissary at Fourteenth and Cary streets, on the eastern
edge of the fire. The doors were thrown open and the government
clerks began an orderly distribution of the supplies. Then the
drunken mob joined the crowd.</p>
<p>Barrels of hams, bacon, flour, molasses, sugar, coffee, and tea were
rolled into the streets or thrown from windows. Women ran
screaming through the flames waving sides of bacon and whole
hams. Wheelbarrows were filled and trundled away. When the
building finally caught fire from the whiskey torches, the mob
swarmed into other sections of the doomed city where the few remaining
clothing, jewelry, and furniture stores were ruthlessly looted
and burned. A casket factory was broken into, the caskets loaded
with plunder and carried through the streets, and the fiendish rabble
roared on unchecked.</p>
<p>As the drunken night reeled into morning the few remaining regiments
of General Kershaw’s brigade, which had been guarding the
lines east of Richmond, galloped into the city on their way south
to join Lee in his retreat to Appomattox. They had to fight their
way through the howling mob to reach Mayo’s Bridge. As the
rearguard clattered over, Gen. M. W. Gary shouted, “All over,
good-bye; blow her to hell.”</p>
<p>The barrels of tar placed along the bridge were promptly put to
the torch. Soon tall flames shot high into the air, and with the
two railroad bridges already burning, the three high-arched structures
were like blazing arrows pointing to the very gates of hell.</p>
<p>Then down Osborne Turnpike and into Main Street trotted the
Fourth Massachusetts cavalry. When the smoke and heat blocked
their path, they turned into Fourteenth Street past fire engines blazing
in the street and proceeded up the hill to Capitol Square, where a
tragic scene awaited them.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_43">43</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig35"> <ANTIMG src="images/p24.jpg" alt="" width-obs="587" height-obs="799" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Richmond burns.</i> From a contemporary sketch.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_44">44</div>
<p>Like a green oasis in a veritable desert of fire and destruction, the
sloping lawn around the Capitol was jammed with frightened people
seeking safety from the flames. Family groups, trying desperately to
stay together, huddled under the linden trees for protection from
the burning sparks. Piles of furniture were scattered in every direction—beds,
chairs, settees, paintings, silverware, gilt-framed mirrors—the
few possessions left, the family heirlooms, the treasures faithfully
passed down from generation to generation. In the background
the massive white columns of the Capitol, designed by
Thomas Jefferson as a replica of the famous Maison Carée at Nimes,
stood guard over the huddled masses below.</p>
<p>The soldiers in blue quickly dispersed the mobs at bayonet point.
Guards were immediately placed to prevent further looting. The
fire was contained by blowing up buildings in its path to create a
fire-lane, leaving the main part to burn itself out. By nightfall
everything was under control, but most of the business and industrial
section of the city was gone.</p>
<p>The stars shone down that night on the smouldering ruins of more
than 700 buildings. Gaunt chimneys stood naked against the black
velvet sky. A Federal officer, picking his way through thousands of
pieces of white granite columns and marble facades that littered the
streets to inspect the guard, noted that the silence of death brooded
over the city. Occasionally a shell exploded somewhere in the ruins.
Then it was quiet again.</p>
<p>A week later Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox Court
House, Va. The war was over.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig36"> <ANTIMG src="images/p25.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="549" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Richmond after the war.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_45">45</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig37"> <ANTIMG src="images/p25a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="681" height-obs="1000" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Richmond National Battlefield Park.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_46">46</div>
<h2 id="c20"><span class="small"><i>The Park</i></span></h2>
<p>Richmond National Battlefield Park was established on July 14,
1944, as authorized by act of Congress. The property was originally
acquired by a group of public-spirited Virginians who donated it to
the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1932. The park occupies nearly
800 acres of land in 10 widely separated parcels. Included are some
6 acres in Chimborazo Park on East Broad Street, site of Chimborazo
Hospital during the Civil War.</p>
<p>A complete tour of the battlefields requires a 57-mile drive which
is outlined on the map in this booklet. We suggest that you begin
at the main Visitor Center in Chimborazo Park, 3215 East
Broad Street, Richmond, where museum exhibits and an audio-visual
program are available to enhance your appreciation of this
battlefield area.</p>
<p>Markers, maps, and interpretive devices along the tour will help
you to understand the military operations. You will see parts of
the fields of combat, massive forts, and intricate field fortifications.
Two houses on the battlefields have wartime associations—the Watt
House (Gen. Fitz-John Porter’s headquarters) and the Garthright
House (Union field hospital).</p>
<h2 id="c21"><span class="small"><i>Administration</i></span></h2>
<p>Richmond National Battlefield Park is administered by the National
Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. A superindendent,
whose address is 3215 East Broad Street, Richmond, Va., is in immediate
charge.</p>
<p><span class="lr"><span class="smaller"><span class="ss">U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 OF-588588</span></span></span></p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_47">47</div>
<h2 class="center"><span class="small">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE</span> <br/>HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES</h2>
<p class="center smaller">(PRICE LISTS OF NATIONAL PARK SERVICE PUBLICATIONS MAY BE OBTAINED FROM THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS, WASHINGTON 25, D.C.)</p>
<dl class="undent"><br/>Antietam
<br/>Bandelier
<br/>Chalmette
<br/>Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battlefields
<br/>Custer Battlefield
<br/>Custis-Lee Mansion, The Robert E. Lee Memorial
<br/>Fort Laramie
<br/>Fort McHenry
<br/>Fort Necessity
<br/>Fort Pulaski
<br/>Fort Raleigh
<br/>Fort Sumter
<br/>George Washington Birthplace
<br/>Gettysburg
<br/>Guilford Courthouse
<br/>Hopewell Village
<br/>Independence
<br/>Jamestown, Virginia
<br/>Kings Mountain
<br/>The Lincoln Museum and the House Where Lincoln Died
<br/>Manassas (Bull Run)
<br/>Montezuma Castle
<br/>Morristown, A Military Capital of the Revolution
<br/>Ocmulgee
<br/>Petersburg Battlefields
<br/>Richmond Battlefields
<br/>Saratoga
<br/>Scotts Bluff
<br/>Shiloh
<br/>Statue of Liberty
<br/>Vanderbilt Mansion
<br/>Vicksburg
<br/>Yorktown
<div class="fig"> id="fig38"> <ANTIMG src="images/p30.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="385" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Roll book of 27th N. Y. Regiment punctured by Confederate bullet</i></p> </div>
<h2>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
<ul>
<li>Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook is public-domain in the country of publication.</li>
<li>Corrected a few palpable typos.</li>
<li>In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by _underscores_.</li>
</ul>
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