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<ANTIMG id="coverpage" src="images/cover.jpg" alt="Antietam National Battlefield · Maryland" width-obs="500" height-obs="791" /></div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p02.jpg" alt="U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR · March 3, 1849" width-obs="300" height-obs="300" /></div>
<p class="center">UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR</p>
<p class="center"><span class="small">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE</span></p>
<p class="tbcenter"><i>HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER THIRTY-ONE</i></p>
<p>This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the
historical and archeological areas in the National Park System
administered by the National Park Service of the United States
Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government
Printing Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of
Documents. Washington. D.C. 20402.</p>
<div class="box">
<h1><span class="large">ANTIETAM</span> <br/><span class="small">National Battlefield · Maryland</span></h1>
<p class="center"><b><i>by Frederick Tilberg</i></b></p>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p02a.jpg" alt="Revolver" width-obs="400" height-obs="306" /></div>
<p class="center small">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 31
<br/>Washington, D.C. · 1960
<br/>(Revised 1961)
<br/><span class="small">Reprint with minor corrections 1980</span></p>
</div>
<div class="box">
<p><i>The National Park System, of which Antietam National
Battlefield Site is a unit, is dedicated to conserving
the scenic, scientific, and historic heritage of the United
States for the benefit and inspiration of its people.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p03.jpg" alt="NATIONAL PARK SERVICE · DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR" width-obs="371" height-obs="470" /></div>
<h2 class="center"><i>Contents</i></h2>
<dt class="small"><i>Page</i>
<br/><SPAN href="#c1">ACROSS THE POTOMAC</SPAN> 1
<br/><SPAN href="#c2">McCLELLAN IN COMMAND</SPAN> 4
<br/><SPAN href="#c3">LEE DIVIDES HIS FORCES</SPAN> 6
<br/><SPAN href="#c4">THE LOST ORDER</SPAN> 9
<br/><SPAN href="#c5">FIGHTING FOR TIME AT SOUTH MOUNTAIN</SPAN> 10
<br/><SPAN href="#c6">HARPERS FERRY SURRENDERS</SPAN> 13
<br/><SPAN href="#c7">LEE TAKES A STAND ON SHARPSBURG RIDGE</SPAN> 14
<br/><SPAN href="#c8">McCLELLAN CONCENTRATES AT THE ANTIETAM</SPAN> 16
<br/><SPAN href="#c9">THE LINES ARE POISED FOR ACTION</SPAN> 18
<br/><SPAN href="#c10">HOOKER STRIKES AT DAYBREAK</SPAN> 21
<br/><SPAN href="#c11">MANSFIELD RENEWS THE ATTACK</SPAN> 23
<br/><SPAN href="#c12">JACKSON PREPARES AN AMBUSH</SPAN> 25
<br/><SPAN href="#c13">THE FIGHT FOR THE SUNKEN ROAD</SPAN> 34
<br/><SPAN href="#c14">BURNSIDE TAKES THE LOWER BRIDGE</SPAN> 40
<br/><SPAN href="#c15">A. P. HILL TURNS THE TIDE</SPAN> 44
<br/><SPAN href="#c16">RETREAT FROM SHARPSBURG</SPAN> 45
<br/><SPAN href="#c17">THE BATTLE AND THE CAMPAIGN</SPAN> 47
<br/><SPAN href="#c18">THE WAR FOR THE UNION TAKES ON A NEW PURPOSE</SPAN> 47
<br/><SPAN href="#c19">CLARA BARTON AT ANTIETAM</SPAN> 49
<br/><SPAN href="#c20">ANTIETAM NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD AND CEMETERY</SPAN> 50
<br/><SPAN href="#c21">ADMINISTRATION</SPAN> 55
<br/><SPAN href="#c22">SUGGESTED READINGS</SPAN> 56
<br/><SPAN href="#c23">APPENDIX</SPAN> 57
<div class="fig"> id="fig1"> <ANTIMG src="images/p04.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="502" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Focal point of the early morning attacks, the Dunker Church and some who defended it.</i> From photograph attributed to James Gardner. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_1">1</div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p04b.jpg" alt="Cannon and crew." width-obs="500" height-obs="285" /></div>
<p class="tb"><i>In Western Maryland is a stream called Antietam Creek.
Nearby is the quiet town of Sharpsburg. The scene is pastoral, with
rolling hills and farmlands and patches of woods. Stone monuments and
bronze tablets dot the landscape. They seem strangely out of place. Only some
extraordinary event can explain their presence.</i></p>
<p><i>Almost by chance, two great armies collided here. Gen. Robert E. Lee’s
Army of Northern Virginia was invading the North. Maj. Gen. George
B. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac was out to stop him. On September
17, 1862—the bloodiest day of the Civil War—the two armies fought the
Battle of Antietam to decide the issue.</i></p>
<p><i>Their violent conflict shattered the quiet of Maryland’s countryside. When
the hot September sun finally set upon the devastated battlefield, 23,000
Americans had fallen—nearly eight times more than fell on Tarawa’s beaches
in World War II. This single fact, with the heroism and suffering it implies,
gives the monuments and markers their meaning. No longer do they
presume upon the land. Rather, their mute inadequacy can only hint of the
great event that happened here—and of its even greater consequences.</i></p>
<h2 id="c1"><span class="small"><i>Across the Potomac</i></span></h2>
<p>On September 4-7, 1862, a ragged host of nearly 55,000 men in butternut
and gray splashed across the Potomac River at White’s Ford
near Leesburg, Va. This was Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern
Virginia embarked on the Confederacy’s first invasion of the
North. Though thousands of Lee’s men were shoeless, though they
lacked ammunition and supplies, though they were fatigued from
the marching and fighting just before the historic crossing into
Maryland, they felt invincible.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_2">2</div>
<p>Only a week before, August 28-30, they had routed the Federals
at the Battle of Second Manassas, driving them headlong into the
defenses of Washington. With this event, the strategic initiative
so long held by Union forces in the East had shifted to the Confederacy.
But Lee recognized that Union power was almost limitless.
It must be kept off balance—prevented from reorganizing for
another drive on Richmond, the Confederate capital. Only a sharp
offensive thrust by Southern arms would do this.</p>
<p>Because his army lacked the strength to assault Washington, General
Lee had decided on September 3 to invade Maryland. North
of the Potomac his army would be a constant threat to Washington.
This would keep Federal forces out of Virginia, allowing that
ravaged land to recuperate from the campaigning that had stripped
it. It would give Maryland’s people, many of whom sympathized
with the South, a chance to throw off the Northern yoke.</p>
<p>From Maryland, Lee could march into Pennsylvania, disrupting the
east-west rail communications of the North, carrying the brunt of
war into that rich land, drawing on its wealth to refit his army.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig2"> <ANTIMG src="images/p05.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="570" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Lee’s army crossing the Potomac; Union scouts in foreground.</i> From wartime sketch by A. R. Waud. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_3">3</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig3"> <ANTIMG src="images/p05a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="938" /> <p class="pcap"><b>LEE INVADES MARYLAND</b></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_4">4</div>
<p>Larger political possibilities loomed, too. The North was war
weary. If, in the heartland of the Union, Lee could inflict a serious
defeat on Northern arms, the Confederacy might hope for more
than military dividends—the result might be a negotiated peace on
the basis of Southern independence. Too, a successful campaign
might induce England and France to recognize the Confederacy and
to intervene for the purpose of mediating the conflict.</p>
<p>So it was that the hopes of the South rode with this Army of
Northern Virginia as it marched into Frederick, Md., on September 7.</p>
<h2 id="c2"><span class="small"><i>McClellan in Command</i></span></h2>
<p>On that same September 7, another army assembled at Rockville,
Md., just northwest of Washington. Soon to be nearly 90,000 strong,
this was Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac.
Its goal: To stay between Lee’s army and Washington, to seek out
the Confederate force, and, as President Abraham Lincoln hoped, to
destroy it.</p>
<p>Hastily thrown together to meet the challenge of Lee’s invasion,
this Union army was a conglomerate of all the forces in the Washington
vicinity. Some of its men were fresh from the recruiting depots—they
lacked training and were deficient in arms. Others had just
returned from the Peninsular Campaign where Lee’s army had
driven them from the gates of Richmond in the Seven Days’ Battles,
June 26-July 2. Still others were the remnants of the force so
decisively beaten at Second Manassas.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig4"> <ANTIMG src="images/p06.jpg" alt="" width-obs="438" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Gen. Robert E. Lee.</i> From photograph by Julian Vannerson. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_5">5</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig5"> <ANTIMG src="images/p06b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="416" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan.</i> From photograph by Matthew B. Brady or assistant. Courtesy, National Archives.</p> </div>
<p>In McClellan the Union army had a commander who was skilled
at organization. This was the reason President Lincoln and Commander
in Chief of the Army Henry Halleck had chosen him for
command on September 3. In 4 days he had pulled together this
new army and had gotten it on the march. It was a remarkable
achievement.</p>
<p>But in other respects, McClellan was the object of doubt. He
was cautious. He seemed to lack that capacity for full and violent
commitment essential to victory. Against Lee, whose blood roused
at the sound of the guns, McClellan’s methodical nature had once
before proved wanting—during the Seven Days’ Battles. At least
so thought President Lincoln.</p>
<p>But this time McClellan had started well. Could he now catch
Lee’s army and destroy it, bringing the end of the war in sight?
Or, failing that, could he at least gain a favorable decision? A victory
in the field would give the President a chance to issue the
Emancipation Proclamation, which he had been holding since midsummer.
The proclamation would declare free the slaves in the Confederate
States. By this means, Lincoln hoped to infuse the Northern
cause with regenerative moral power. Spirits were lagging in the
North. Unless a moral purpose could be added to the North’s primary
war aim of restoring the Union, Lincoln questioned whether
<span class="pb" id="Page_6">6</span>
the will to fight could be maintained in the face of growing casualty
lists.</p>
<p>And so, followed by mingled doubt and hope, McClellan started
in pursuit of the Confederate army. McClellan himself was aware
of these mingled feelings. He knew that Lincoln and Halleck had
come to him as a last resort in a time of emergency. He knew
they doubted his energy and ability as a combat commander. Even
his orders were unclear, for they did not explicitly give him authority
to pursue the enemy beyond the defenses of Washington.</p>
<p>Burdened with knowledge of this lack of faith, wary of taking
risks because of his ambiguous orders, McClellan marched toward
his encounter with the victorious and confident Lee.</p>
<h2 id="c3"><span class="small"><i>Lee Divides His Forces</i></span></h2>
<p>Maryland was a disappointment to Lee. On September 8, he had
issued a dignified proclamation inviting the men of that State to
join his command and help restore Maryland to her rightful place
among the Southern States. His words concluded with assurance
that the Marylanders could make their choice with no fear of intimidation
from the victorious Confederate army in their midst.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig6"> <ANTIMG src="images/p07.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="518" /> <p class="pcap"><i>First Virginia Cavalry at a halt during invasion of Maryland.</i> From wartime sketch by Waud. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<p>Maryland took him at his word. Her people did not flock to
the Confederate standard, nor were they much help in provisioning
his army. No doubt Lee’s barefooted soldiers were a portent to
<span class="pb" id="Page_7">7</span>
these people, who had previously seen only well-fed, well-equipped
Federal troops.</p>
<p>Deprived of expected aid, Lee had to move onward to Pennsylvania
quickly. For one thing, unless he could get shoes for his
men, his army might melt away. Straggling was already a serious
problem, for Maryland’s hard roads tortured bare feet toughened only
to the dirt lanes of Virginia.</p>
<p>By now, Lee’s scouts were bringing reports of the great Federal
army slowly pushing out from Rockville toward Frederick.</p>
<p>Lee’s proposed route into Pennsylvania was dictated by geography.
West of Frederick—beyond South Mountain—is the Cumberland
Valley. This is the northern half of the Great Valley that sweeps
northeastward through Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. That
part of the Great Valley immediately south of the Potomac is called
the Shenandoah Valley.</p>
<p>Lee planned to concentrate his army west of the mountains near
Hagerstown, Md. There he would be in direct line with his supply
base at Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley. After replenishing
his supplies and ammunition, he could strike northeast through
the Cumberland Valley toward Harrisburg, Pa., where he could destroy
the Pennsylvania Railroad bridge across the Susquehanna River.
Once loose in the middle of Pennsylvania he could live off the country
and threaten Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington.</p>
<p>Before launching this daring maneuver, Lee must first clear his line
of communications through the Shenandoah Valley to Winchester
and to Richmond. Blocking it were strong Federal garrisons at
Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg. Unaccountably, they had remained
at their posts after the Confederate army crossed the Potomac. Now
they must be cleared out.</p>
<p>Lee decided to accomplish this mission by boldly dividing his army
into four parts. On September 9, he issued Special Order 191.
Briefly, it directed Maj. Gen. James Longstreet and Maj. Gen. D. H.
Hill to proceed across South Mountain toward Boonsboro and Hagerstown.
Three columns cooperating under Maj. Gen. Thomas J.
“Stonewall” Jackson were ordered to converge on Harpers Ferry
from the northwest, northeast, and east. En route, the column under
Jackson’s immediate command was to swing westward and catch
any Federals remaining at Martinsburg. Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws,
approaching from the northeast, was to occupy Maryland Heights,
which overlooks Harpers Ferry from the north side of the Potomac.
Brig. Gen. John Walker, approaching from the east, was to occupy
Loudoun Heights, across the Shenandoah River from Harpers
Ferry. Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry was to screen these movements
from McClellan by remaining east of South Mountain.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_8">8</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig7"> <ANTIMG src="images/p08.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="957" /> <p class="pcap"><b>LEE’S SPECIAL ORDER</b></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_9">9</div>
<p>(At this point a fateful event occurred—one which was destined to
change the subsequent course of the campaign. D. H. Hill, Jackson’s
brother-in-law, had until this time been under Jackson’s command.
Unaware that a copy of Lee’s order had already been sent to Hill,
Jackson now prepared an extra copy for that officer. Hill kept the
copy from Jackson; the other was to provide the script for much of
the drama that followed.)</p>
<p>Lee was courting danger by thus dividing his force in the face of
McClellan’s advancing army. Against a driving opponent, Lee probably
would not have done it. But he felt certain that McClellan’s
caution would give Jackson the margin of time needed to capture
Harpers Ferry and reunite with Longstreet before the Federal army
could come within striking distance. That margin was calculated at
3 or 4 days. By September 12, Jackson’s force should be marching
north toward Hagerstown. As soon as the army reconcentrated there,
Lee could begin his dash up the Cumberland Valley into Pennsylvania.</p>
<p>So confident was Lee of the marching capacities of the Harpers
Ferry columns, and so certain was he that McClellan would approach
slowly, that he made no provision for guarding the gaps
through South Mountain.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig8"> <ANTIMG src="images/p08a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="486" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. James Longstreet.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig9"> <ANTIMG src="images/p08b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="481" height-obs="599" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson.</i> From photograph by George W. Minnes. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p>
</div>
<h2 id="c4"><span class="small"><i>The Lost Order</i></span></h2>
<p>Lee’s army departed Frederick on September 10. Two days later
leading elements of McClellan’s army entered that city. On September
13, came McClellan himself with his usual cavalcade of staff
officers.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_10">10</div>
<p>That same afternoon a copy of Lee’s Special Order 191 was discovered
in the encampment grounds previously used by the Confederate
army. Quickly it was passed to McClellan. The handwriting
was recognized as that of Col. R. H. Chilton, Lee’s assistant
adjutant general; the document’s authenticity could not be doubted.</p>
<p>The fate of Lee’s army literally lay in McClellan’s hands. If he
slashed swiftly through the South Mountain gaps and planted his
army squarely between Longstreet’s force near Hagerstown and
Jackson’s columns at Harpers Ferry, he could overwhelm the Confederate
detachments in turn.</p>
<p>But again McClellan was methodical. Not until the next morning,
September 14, did his heavy columns get underway. This
crucial delay was to give Lee the chance to pull his army together
at the small town of Sharpsburg.</p>
<h2 id="c5"><span class="small"><i>Fighting for Time at South Mountain</i></span></h2>
<p>By September 12, Lee had begun to worry. Stuart’s scouts had
reported the Federal approach to Frederick. McClellan was moving
too fast. Next evening things looked worse. Jackson had not yet
captured Harpers Ferry, and already McClellan’s forward troops
were pushing Stuart back toward the South Mountain gaps. Delay
at Harpers Ferry made these passes through South Mountain the
key to the situation. They must be defended.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig10"> <ANTIMG src="images/p09.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="469" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The Battle of South Mountain.</i> From lithograph by Endicott. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<p>South Mountain is the watershed between the Middletown and
<span class="pb" id="Page_11">11</span>
Cumberland Valleys. The Frederick-Hagerstown road leads through
Middletown, then goes over South Mountain at Turner’s Gap. At
the eastern base of the mountain, the old road to Sharpsburg
turned south from the main road and passed through Fox’s Gap, a
mile south of Turner’s Gap. Four miles farther south is Crampton’s
Gap, reached by another road from Middletown.</p>
<p>On the night of September 13, Lee ordered all available forces
to defend these three passes. D. H. Hill, with Longstreet coming
to his aid, covered Turner’s and Fox’s Gaps. McLaws sent part of
his force back from Maryland Heights to hold Crampton’s Gap.</p>
<p>Next morning the thin-stretched Confederate defenders saw
McClellan’s powerful columns marching across Middletown Valley.
Up the roads to the gaps they came—ponderous and inexorable.
The right wing of McClellan’s army under Maj. Gen. Ambrose
Burnside assaulted Turner’s and Fox’s Gaps. The left wing under
Maj. Gen. William Franklin struck through Crampton’s Gap. By
nightfall, September 14, the superior Federal forces had broken
through at Crampton’s Gap; and Burnside’s men were close to
victory at the northern passes. The way to the valley was open.</p>
<p>By his stubborn defense at South Mountain, Lee had gained a
day. But was it enough? McClellan’s speed and shrewd pursuit,
together with Jackson’s inability to meet the demanding schedule
set forth in Special Order 191, had fallen upon Lee with all the
weight of a strategic surprise. No longer could he command events,
pick his own objectives, and make the Federal army conform to his
moves. Rather, the decision at South Mountain had snatched the
initiative away from Lee. His plan for an offensive foray into Pennsylvania
was wrecked. Now it was a question of saving his army.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig11"> <ANTIMG src="images/p09a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="366" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Harpers Ferry looking east toward confluence of Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers. Ruins of armory in right foreground. Maryland Heights, left; Loudoun Heights, right.</i> From 1862 photograph by Brady. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p>
</div>
<p>The first step was to call off the attack on Harpers Ferry. At
8 p.m., September 14, Lee sent a dispatch to McLaws stating,</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_12">12</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig12"> <ANTIMG src="images/p10.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="503" /> <p class="pcap"><b>ATTACK ON HARPERS FERRY</b></p> </div>
<blockquote>
<div class="pb" id="Page_13">13</div>
<p>“The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg and cross
the river. It is necessary for you to abandon your position tonight.... Send
forward officers to explore the way, ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac,
and if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown leave Shepherdstown
Ford for this command.” Jackson was ordered “... to take position at Shepherdstown
to cover Lee’s crossing into Virginia.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But then came a message from Jackson: Harpers Ferry was about
to fall. Perhaps there was still hope. If Jackson could capture
Harpers Ferry early the next day, the army could reunite at Sharpsburg.
Good defensive ground was there; a victory over McClellan
might enable Lee to continue his campaign of maneuver; and should
disaster threaten, the fords of the Potomac were nearby.</p>
<p>At 11:15 p.m., Lee countermanded his earlier order; the attack
on Harpers Ferry was to proceed. Shortly after, Longstreet’s
divisions began to march through the night toward Sharpsburg.</p>
<h2 id="c6"><span class="small"><i>Harpers Ferry Surrenders</i></span></h2>
<p>The village of Harpers Ferry lies at the gateway cut through the
mountains by the Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers, whose waters
join there. Situated at the apex of the triangle of land between
the rivers, the town is completely dominated by Loudoun and
Maryland Heights. By nightfall of September 14, McLaws and
Walker had artillery on these heights ready for plunging fire into
the town; Jackson had stretched his lines across the base of the
triangle between the rivers.</p>
<p>Caught in this trap were nearly 12,000 Federal troops commanded
by Col. D. S. Miles. Their position was indefensible.</p>
<p>At daybreak on September 15, the surrounding Confederate artillery
opened fire. At 8 a.m., the hopelessness of his position confirmed,
Miles ordered the surrender; he was killed in the last
moments of the battle.</p>
<p>Jackson immediately sent word of his victory to Lee. Then, after
assigning Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill’s division to dispose of prisoners
and booty, he prepared the rest of his troops for the hard march
ahead.</p>
<p>The same dawn that signaled Jackson’s guns to open fire on
Harpers Ferry revealed Longstreet’s tired soldiers taking position on
the rolling hills around Sharpsburg. As he watched them, Lee still
did not know whether to fight or to withdraw across the Potomac.
Decision waited upon word from Jackson. The word came; it was
good; the crisis was past. Even now Lee’s messenger hurried to
direct Jackson’s veterans toward Sharpsburg. Confident that the
entire army would soon be at hand, certain that he could whip
McClellan, Lee decided to fight.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_14">14</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig13"> <ANTIMG src="images/p11.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="472" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Sharpsburg shortly after the Battle of Antietam. Taken from crest of Sharpsburg Ridge, looking west down Boonsboro Pike toward Potomac River. Hagerstown Pike heads north (right) just beyond large tree in left-center. Lee’s headquarters were in
Oak Grove in distance, just to right of Boonsboro Pike.</i></p>
</div>
<h2 id="c7"><span class="small"><i>Lee Takes a Stand on Sharpsburg Ridge</i></span></h2>
<p>Lee’s decision to make his stand on the low ridge extending north
and south of Sharpsburg might well have led to disaster for the
Confederate army. A large part of his force was still scattered and
several miles away. Backed against the coils of the Potomac River,
with only the ford near Shepherdstown offering an avenue of withdrawal,
a reversal in battle could result in rout and consequent loss
of thousands of men and scores of guns. Longstreet voiced disapproval
of battle at Sharpsburg. Jackson, hurriedly examining the
ground on his arrival from Harpers Ferry, strongly favored Lee’s
choice.</p>
<p>The village of Sharpsburg lies in a small valley at the western
base of Sharpsburg Ridge. From the village, the Boonsboro Pike
leads east across the ridge, then across Antietam Creek. The Hagerstown
Pike extends northward on the crest of the ridge.</p>
<p>From the Hagerstown Pike, gently rolling farmland spreads a
mile eastward to Antietam Creek and the same distance westward
to the winding Potomac River. A mile north of Sharpsburg was
a heavy patch of trees known as West Woods; it was about 300
yards wide at its southern limits, tapering to 200 yards or less as
<span class="pb" id="Page_15">15</span>
it stretched away northwest from the pike. Half a mile east of
Hagerstown Pike was another patch of trees called East Woods; it
was 200 yards wide and extended a quarter mile south across the
Smoketown Road. North Woods, a triangular plot of trees,
stretched east from the Hagerstown Pike over the Poffenberger
farm. Half a mile to the west looms Nicodemus Hill, a prominent
landmark near the Potomac. Artillery on its heights would
command the open ground lying between the patches of woodland.
In this open area east of the Hagerstown Pike lay a 40-acre cornfield.
West of the pike were outcroppings of rock running nearly
parallel to the road—ready-made fortifications. Adjacent to the
Hagerstown Pike, on a slight rise near the lower end of West Woods,
stood a Dunker Church, a small white building framed by massive
oaks. Southeast of Sharpsburg, rolling land broken by deep ravines
extends a mile beyond to a sharp bend in Antietam Creek.</p>
<p>Crossings of swiftly flowing Antietam Creek were readily available.
The road extending northwest from Keedysville went over
the stream at the Upper Bridge, the road to Sharpsburg from Boonsboro
over the Middle Bridge, and the road to Sharpsburg from
Pleasant Valley over the Lower Bridge. The stream could be crossed,
also, at Pry’s Mill Ford, a half mile south of the Upper Bridge, at
Snavely’s Ford, nearly a mile south of the Lower Bridge, and at
other unnamed fording places.</p>
<p>With its advantages of woodland and outcroppings of rock ledges,
Lee believed that the ridge north of Sharpsburg offered a strong
battle position. Though he had ample time to construct earthworks,
the Confederate commander chose to rely wholly on natural
defenses.</p>
<p>As Lee’s men approached from Boonsboro during the morning
hours of September 15, they turned left and right off the pike to
form their lines on Sharpsburg Ridge. Brig. Gen. John Hood, with
only two brigades, held the ground at the fringe of the West
Woods—from the Dunker Church northwest to Nicodemus Hill
near the Potomac. Here, Stuart’s cavalry protected the left end or
flank of the line. From Hood’s position southward to Sharpsburg,
D. H. Hill placed his five brigades east of and paralleling the
Hagerstown Pike. Brig. Gen. Nathan Evan’s brigade occupied the
center of the line in front of Sharpsburg; his men straddled the
Boonsboro Pike. The six brigades of Maj. Gen. D. R. Jones extended
the Confederate front southeast nearly a mile to the Lower
Bridge over Antietam Creek. The fords over the Antietam at the
extreme right of the line were guarded by Col. Thomas Munford’s
cavalry brigade. Artillery was placed at vantage points on the ridges.</p>
<p>Throughout the 15th, Lee presented a show of strength with 14
brigades of infantry and 3 of cavalry—about 18,000 men.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_16">16</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig14"> <ANTIMG src="images/p12.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="554" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Army supply train crosses Middle Bridge over Antietam Creek. After ascent of ridge in background, Boonsboro Pike dips into a ravine, then ascends Sharpsburg Ridge and enters the village.</i> Courtesy, National Archives.</p>
</div>
<h2 id="c8"><span class="small"><i>McClellan Concentrates at the Antietam</i></span></h2>
<p>Against this pretense of power, General McClellan marched cautiously
on the forenoon of the 15th, over good roads and in fine
weather. By noon, he arrived at the Confederate front with a force
of nearly 75,000 men. McClellan hesitated, and the day wore away.</p>
<p>As the early morning fog of the 16th cleared, Lee’s artillerists
caught sight of Federal guns on the high bank beyond Antietam
Creek. The thunder of a prolonged duel between Lee’s guns and
Brig. Gen. Henry Hunt’s powerful Federal batteries soon rolled
through the hills. There was no question in McClellan’s mind now
that Lee intended to hold Sharpsburg Ridge.</p>
<p>In midafternoon of the 16th, McClellan prepared for battle. Maj.
Gen. Joseph Hooker’s I Corps was instructed to take position opposite
the Confederate left on the Hagerstown Pike. Maj. Gen.
Joseph Mansfield’s XII Corps and Maj. Gen. Edwin Sumner’s II
Corps were to extend the battleline from Hooker’s left to the
Smoketown Road and on to Antietam Creek near Pry’s Mill Ford.
The V Corps, Maj. Gen. Fitz-John Porter commanding, was directed
to occupy the center of the Federal line on the Boonsboro Pike.
<span class="pb" id="Page_17">17</span>
Burnside was to place his IX Corps just east of the Lower Bridge
over Antietam Creek. Maj. Gen. William Franklin’s VI Corps was
to support the entire front. In the center, on the high east bank
of Antietam Creek, and south of the Boonsboro Pike, General
Hunt placed four batteries of 20-pounder Parrott rifles, the most
powerful cannon on the field.</p>
<p>McClellan’s plan called for an initial attack on the Confederate
left flank on the Hagerstown Pike with the two corps of Hooker
and Mansfield. McClellan intended to support this mass charge
with Sumner’s entire force and, if necessary, with Franklin’s corps.
If the powerful thrust against the Confederate left should succeed,
McClellan would send Burnside’s corps across Antietam Creek at
the Lower Bridge and strike the Confederate right flank on the
ridge southeast of Sharpsburg. Should Burnside succeed in turning
the southern end of Lee’s line, he would be expected to carry the
attack northwest toward Sharpsburg. Finally, if either of these
flanking movements appeared successful, McClellan would drive up
the Boonsboro Pike with all available forces to smash the Confederate
center.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig15"> <ANTIMG src="images/p12a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="435" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Meadow just beyond trees bordering Antietam Creek marks top of bluffs where many of Hunt’s Union batteries were placed. This view from one-half mile in front of Confederate gun emplacements on Sharpsburg Ridge.</i></p>
</div>
<p>It was a good plan. If the Federal attacks could be delivered in
concert, McClellan’s preponderance of power must stretch Lee’s
smaller force to the breaking point. But the story of Antietam is
one of piecemeal Federal attacks—a corps here, a division there.
This failure in execution allowed Lee to shift troops from momentarily
quiet sectors to plug the gaps torn by the succession of Federal
attacks. As each threat developed, Lee rushed his troops there
and beat it back. Taking advantage of his interior lines, he repeatedly
<span class="pb" id="Page_18">18</span>
achieved a local advantage of numbers, though larger Federal
contingents were always nearby.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig16"> <ANTIMG src="images/p13.jpg" alt="" width-obs="492" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Brig. Gen. W. N. Pendleton, Lee’s chief of artillery.</i> From Miller’s Photographic History of the Civil War.</p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig17"> <ANTIMG src="images/p13a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="420" height-obs="601" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Brig. Gen. Henry Hunt, McClellan’s chief of artillery.</i></p> </div>
<h2 id="c9"><span class="small"><i>The Lines Are Poised for Action</i></span></h2>
<p>At 2 p.m. on the 16th, Hooker marched from his camp near
Keedysville, crossed the Upper Bridge, and late in the afternoon
reached the Hagerstown Pike. Under cover of the North Woods,
his divisions formed for the attack on both sides of the pike. A
massed force of more than 12,000 men was ready to advance on
the Confederates.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig18"> <ANTIMG src="images/p13c.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="299" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Union artillery in battery line.</i> From 1863 photograph. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<p>Lee’s thin line, 3 miles long, had been reinforced early on the
16th by the arrival of Jackson’s troops from Harpers Ferry. They
were placed where they could support the northern part of the
<span class="pb" id="Page_19">19</span>
Confederate line. John Walker’s division, arriving from Harpers
Ferry in the afternoon, took position south of Sharpsburg.</p>
<p>Jackson now commanded the Confederate front north of Sharpsburg;
Longstreet, with a part of his force north of the village,
extended the line nearly a mile south.</p>
<p>When Lee’s outposts near Antietam Creek informed him in midafternoon
that Hooker’s Federals were massing north of Sharpsburg,
Lee moved some of his men to advance positions. Hood established
a line east of the Hagerstown Pike, with part of his troops
in a cornfield and others extending the front to the East Woods.
Skirmishers spread out far in front. Additional troops were rushed
from reserve near Lee’s headquarters at the Oak Grove west of
Sharpsburg; they extended the line west across the Hagerstown Pike.</p>
<p>It was dusk by the time Hooker’s force was ready to charge.
With Maj. Gen. George Meade’s men leading the way, they struck
Hood’s Confederates at the edge of the East Woods and in the
adjacent fields. A brisk artillery fire from opposing batteries forced
the men to seek cover. The gathering darkness made it difficult
for the forces on either side to locate their marks. Gradually the
opening skirmish at Antietam ended. The thrust of the Federal
skirmishers, however, made it clear to Lee just where the next
Federal blow would fall.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig19"> <ANTIMG src="images/p13e.jpg" alt="" width-obs="429" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Brig. Gen. John B. Hood.</i></p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig20"> <ANTIMG src="images/p13f.jpg" alt="" width-obs="454" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker.</i> From photograph by Brady or assistant. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p>
</div>
<p>Even as Hooker’s Federals withdrew to the cover of the North
<span class="pb" id="Page_20">20</span>
Woods, strong forces were moving to their aid—the two powerful
corps under Mansfield and Sumner. Mansfield would lead the XII
Corps across Antietam Creek about midnight and encamp 1½ miles
northeast of Hooker. Sumner’s II Corps would cross the Antietam
at Pry’s Mill Ford at 7:30 the next morning to lend additional
support.</p>
<p>Lee, too, was counting on reinforcements. McLaws’ division was
expected to arrive on the field by midmorning. A. P. Hill, who
had been left at Harpers Ferry to handle details of the surrender,
would arrive late in the day.</p>
<p>On the evening of September 16, picket lines were so close that
the men on both sides, though unable to see each other, could hear
footsteps. They knew that a tremendous struggle would begin at
dawn. Some tried to sleep, but scattered firing throughout the
night made this difficult. Others cleaned and cleaned again their
rifled muskets, whose huge bullets made holes as big as silver
dollars. Artillerists brought up ammunition for their smooth-bore
Napoleons—so deadly at close range—and for the long-range rifled
Parrott guns. And so these men got through the night, each one
facing the impending crisis in his own way.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig21"> <ANTIMG src="images/p14.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="613" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Union signal station on Elk Ridge. From here, McClellan’s observers spotted Confederate troop movements during the battle.</i> Courtesy, National Archives.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_21">21</div>
<h2 id="c10"><span class="small"><i>Hooker Strikes at Daybreak</i></span></h2>
<p>A drizzling rain fell during the night. The morning of the 17th
broke gray and misty, but the skies cleared early. As rays of light
outlined the fringe of trees about the Dunker Church, restless
Federal skirmishers opened fire. A line of rifle fire flashed from the
southern muskets far out in front of the church. Soon, powerful
Federal guns on the bluffs beyond Antietam Creek poured a raking
fire of shot and shell into the Confederate lines. The first stage
of McClellan’s plan of crushing Lee—folding up the Confederate
left flank—was about to begin.</p>
<p>Hooker struck with tremendous force. With skirmishers still
hotly engaged, 10 brigades moved out from the cover of the North
Woods. Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday’s men advanced along the
Hagerstown Pike. Brig. Gen. James Ricketts’ force charged down
the Smoketown road toward the Dunker Church. Part of Meade’s
division in the center was held in reserve. Hooker’s artillery,
massed on the ridge near the Poffenberger house, raked the Confederate
lines. Heads down and bent to the side, like people
breasting a hailstorm, the wave of Federals charged southward,
spreading over the front from East Woods to the fringe of West
Woods.</p>
<p>From left and from right, Confederate brigades poured into the
fray to buttress Jackson’s line of battle. D. H. Hill sent three
brigades from the Sunken Road, dangerously weakening his own
line—but then, first things first, and this is the story of the Confederate
defense throughout the day. Hood’s two brigades stood
in reserve in the woods adjoining the Dunker Church. Eight
thousand Confederates awaited Hooker’s assault.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig22"> <ANTIMG src="images/p14a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="331" /> <p class="pcap"><i>East Woods on left; Miller cornfield, where Lawton’s men were hidden, on right. This view looking south, as Hooker’s men saw it at dawn.</i></p> </div>
<p>While most of Jackson’s men formed a line from east to west
in front of the Dunker Church, Brig. Gen. A. R. Lawton had
sent a strong force into the Miller cornfield, 300 yards in advance,
concealed, he believed, from the enemy.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_22">22</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig23"> <ANTIMG src="images/p15.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="445" /> <p class="pcap"><i>View from the south, as Jackson’s men saw it. Cornfield ahead; East Woods at right.</i></p> </div>
<p>Doubleday’s Federals came upon the cornfield. “As we appeared
at the edge of the corn,” related Maj. Rufus Dawes, “a long line
of men in butternut and gray rose up from the ground. Simultaneously,
the hostile battle lines opened a tremendous fire upon each
other. Men, I cannot say fell; they were knocked out of the ranks
by dozens.” Hooker, nearby, saw farther in the field the reflection
of sunlight from the enemy’s bayonets projecting above the corn.
Ordering all of his spare batteries to the left of this field, the Federal
guns at close range raked the cornfield with canister and shell.
“In the time I am writing,” Hooker later wrote, “every stalk of
corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as
closely as could have been done with a knife, and the slain lay in
rows precisely as they had stood in their ranks a few moments
before. It was never my fortune to witness a more bloody, dismal
battlefield.”</p>
<p>Those Confederates who survived the slaughter in the cornfield
now fled before the Federal onslaught. Heading for West Woods,
they had to clamber over the picket-and-rail fence bordering the
Hagerstown Pike; many were shot in the attempt and lay spread-eagled
across the fence or piled on either side.</p>
<p>One soldier recalled the hysterical excitement that now gripped
the Union troops: The only thought was victory. Without regard
for safety, they charged forward, loading, firing, and shouting as
they advanced. In contrast were the fallen—as waves of blue-clad
troops swept by, wounded men looked up and cried for aid, but
there was no time to stop.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_23">23</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig24"> <ANTIMG src="images/p15b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="445" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Cornfield Avenue, marking southern limit of “bloody cornfield.” Federals charged from right; Confederates counterattacked from left. From photograph taken on anniversary of battle, showing corn as it stood when the fighting began.</i></p>
</div>
<p>While Doubleday’s division charged through the cornfield,
Rickett’s men, on the left of the attacking columns, pushed through
the East Woods to its southern fringe. Capt. Dunbar Ransom’s
battery broke from the cover of the East Woods and fired shot and
shell into the staggering Confederate lines.</p>
<p>For more than an hour, the battlefront flamed along an extended
semicircular line from the open fields of the Mumma farm northwest
through the cornfield to the rocky ledges in West Woods.
The fury of the Federal attack had carried Doubleday’s and Ricketts’
men deep into the Confederate line, and now Meade’s reserve
brigades rushed forward.</p>
<p>In this critical stage, Jackson launched a driving counterattack.
Hood’s men, supported by D. H. Hill’s brigades, battered the Federals
back to the cornfield but were halted by the pointblank fire
of Union guns in East Woods.</p>
<h2 id="c11"><span class="small"><i>Mansfield Renews the Attack</i></span></h2>
<p>As the remnants of Hooker’s command sought shelter under the
cover of powerful Federal batteries in front of East Woods, a new
threat faced the Confederates. Mansfield’s XII Corps, which had
encamped more than a mile to the rear of Hooker during the night,
had marched at the sound of Hooker’s opening guns. At 7:30
a.m., almost an hour and a half later, Mansfield’s force was
<span class="pb" id="Page_24">24</span>
approaching from the north in heavy columns.</p>
<p>Seeing Hooker’s plight, Mansfield now rushed to the forefront
of his men, urging them to the attack. But his work was cut short
by a Confederate ball; mortally wounded, he was carried from the
field.</p>
<p>Without pause, Brig. Gen. Alpheus Williams moved up to command
and the attack swept on over ground just vacated by Hooker.
On the right, Brig. Gen. Samuel Crawford’s division bore down
the Hagerstown Pike toward the Confederates in West Woods.
Attacking in separate units, however, their lines were shattered by
Brig. Gen. J. R. Jones’ men, fighting from the cover of projecting
rocks. J. E. B. Stuart’s artillery, from the hill a half mile to the
west, rapidly dispersed the remnants.</p>
<p>On the left, the Federals fared better. They pounded Hood’s
men back across the fields toward the Dunker Church and opened
a great gap in the Confederate line. Into the hole plunged Brig.
Gen. George S. Greene’s Union division. Only a desperate Confederate
stand stopped Greene’s men at the Dunker Church. There
they remained, an isolated salient beyond support—the Federal
assault had shot its bolt.</p>
<p>Attacking separately, the two corps of Hooker and Mansfield had
each come within a hair of breaking Jackson’s line. What if they
had attacked together? Again and again through this long day, the
same question—changing only the names—would apply.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig25"> <ANTIMG src="images/p16.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="525" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Taken back of the picket-and-rail fence on the Hagerstown Pike, where Jackson’s men attempted to rally in the face of Hooker’s charge.</i> From photograph by Alexander Gardner. Courtesy, National Archives.</p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_25">25</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig26"> <ANTIMG src="images/p16a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="532" height-obs="594" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. Joseph Mansfield.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<p>It may have been while observing this critical fight near the
Dunker Church, that General Lee saw a straggler heading back
toward camp lugging a pig that he had killed. With disaster so
close, and straggling one of its chief causes, Lee momentarily lost
control and ordered Jackson to shoot the man as an example to
the army. Instead, Jackson gave the culprit a musket and placed
him where action was hottest for the rest of the day. He came
through unscathed and was afterward known as the man who had
lost his pig but saved his bacon.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig27"> <ANTIMG src="images/p16b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="351" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Going into Action.</i> From etching by W. H. Shelton. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<h2 id="c12"><span class="small"><i>Jackson Prepares an Ambush</i></span></h2>
<p>By 9 a.m., 3 hours of killing had passed. The Miller cornfield
had become a no-mans’ land, its tall stalks trampled to the ground
<span class="pb" id="Page_26">26</span>
and strewn with blood-soaked corpses. Firing had been so intense,
had so fouled the men’s muskets, that some of them were using
rocks to pound their ramrods home.</p>
<p>For a moment, the fighting ceased. Then powerful reserves were
rushed forward by commanders of both armies to renew the battle.</p>
<p>Jackson was in extreme danger. Greene’s Federals still lurked near
the Dunker Church, waiting only for support to renew their attack
on the frayed Confederate line. And at this very moment a
mass of blue-clad infantry could be seen emerging from the East
Woods half a mile away—it was part of Sumner’s II Corps moving
up for the morning’s third major Federal attack.</p>
<p>Swiftly Jackson gathered together reinforcements from other sectors
of the battlefield. Some had just arrived from Harpers Ferry;
these were McLaws’ men. With hardly a pause they moved north
and disappeared into the West Woods. Lee ordered Walker’s two
brigades north from the Lower Bridge; they too disappeared into the
West Woods. Thus they came, racing from far and near.</p>
<p>As soon as they came in, Jackson craftily placed these men behind
the rocks and ridges at the western fringe of the woods.
Soon they formed a great semicircle whose outer points perfectly
encompassed the 5,000 men in Sumner’s approaching column. Ten
thousand Confederates were there. Now they disappeared into the
landscape and waited.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig28"> <ANTIMG src="images/p17.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="459" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Knap’s Independent Pennsylvania Battery “E” supported Mansfield’s corps.</i> Courtesy, National Archives.</p> </div>
<p>Sumner’s II Corps, under orders to support the attack on the
Confederate left, had prepared at dawn to cross Antietam Creek at
Pry’s Mill Ford. Impatiently, Sumner had awaited the signal to
march while the battle raged with increasing violence on the ridge
beyond the stream. Finally, at 7:30 a.m., he led Maj. Gen. John
Sedgwick’s division across the ford. Brig. Gen. William French’s
division followed, but soon drifted to the south and lost contact
with Sedgwick.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_27">27</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig29"> <ANTIMG src="images/p17a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="504" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Closeup of Dunker Church where Greene’s men were halted.</i> From Gardner’s Photographic Sketch Book. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig30"> <ANTIMG src="images/p17b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="609" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Federal artillery at Antietam. Note the observer in foreground, and the smoke of battle.</i> From photograph by Alexander Gardner. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_28">28</div>
<div class="fig"> id="map1"> <ANTIMG src="images/map_lr.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="615" /> <p class="pcap"><b>THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM<br/><span class="small">SEPTEMBER 17, 1862</span></b></p> <p class="center"><SPAN class="ab1" href="images/map_hr.jpg">High-resolution Map</SPAN></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_30">30</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig31"> <ANTIMG src="images/p19.jpg" alt="" width-obs="485" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner.</i> From photograph by Brady or assistant. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig32"> <ANTIMG src="images/p19a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="479" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick.</i></p> </div>
<p>Believing that he still led two divisions, Sumner continued his
march past the East Woods. By now he knew that the earlier
Federal attackers could give him no support, but he believed that
the Confederates who had repulsed them must be equally exhausted
and disorganized. Striking now—immediately—he might turn the
tide before the enemy had time to recover. In his hurry, Sumner
neglected to make sure that French’s division followed closely in
his rear. Neither had he taken time to reconnoiter the Confederate
front in the West Woods.</p>
<p>Soon after 9 a.m., Sedgwick’s heavy column, with Sumner at the
head, started toward the Hagerstown Pike. Battleflags waving, bayonets
glistening, the division marched forward in brigade front—long
swaying lines of two ranks each.</p>
<p>Unmolested, they crossed the pike and passed into the West
Woods. Almost surrounding them were Jackson’s quietly waiting
10,000. Suddenly the trap was sprung. Caught within a pocket of
almost encircling fire, in such compact formation that return fire
was impossible, Sedgwick’s men were reduced to utter helplessness.
Completely at the mercy of the Confederates on the front, flank,
and rear, the Federal lines were shattered by converging volleys.
So appalling was the slaughter, nearly half of Sedgwick’s 5,000 men,
were struck down in less than 20 minutes.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_31">31</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig33"> <ANTIMG src="images/p19c.jpg" alt="" width-obs="787" height-obs="558" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The Halt of the Line of Battle.</i> From the wartime sketch by Edwin Forbes. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig34"> <ANTIMG src="images/p19d.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="542" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Scene of the ambush. Sedgwick’s men marched in from left; note rock outcroppings where Jackson’s men were hidden.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_32">32</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig35"> <ANTIMG src="images/p20.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="541" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Part of the ground over which Sedgwick’s men fought, possibly near Hagerstown Pike.</i> Courtesy, National Archives.</p> </div>
<p>But the trap had not been completely closed. In the confusion of
the surprise assault, many regiments on the Federal right found an
opening. Hastily withdrawing to the northeast, they soon found
cover under the protecting fire of Sedgwick’s artillery in the cornfield.
Other batteries in the East Woods and to the north joined in
the cannonade.</p>
<p>Eagerly grasping the opportunity for a counterattack, Jackson’s
line now swept across the open fields and charged the Federal batteries
in front of East Woods. But the fire was more than sheer
valor could overcome. Blasted with grape and canister from the
crossfire of 50 guns, the Confederates staggered, then gave way and
drew back to the cover of West Woods. There, protruding rock
strata protected them. Meanwhile, from his menacing position near
the Dunker Church, Greene was driven back by Confederate
reserves.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_33">33</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig36"> <ANTIMG src="images/p20a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="597" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Sunken Road in 1877.</i></p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig37"> <ANTIMG src="images/p20b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="601" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The same view today.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_34">34</div>
<p>Three-quarters of Lee’s army was now north of Sharpsburg. The
successive Federal attacks had punched the northeast salient of the
Confederate left and center inward toward the Dunker Church.
Now these two sectors were merged into one long line that ran
roughly southeast from Nicodemus Hill, past the Dunker Church,
to end along the Sunken Road. What had been the right (southern)
end of the long Confederate line was now the rear. Properly speaking,
Lee had no center. He had two separate lines—the main one,
facing northeast toward East Woods; and a detached guard force,
facing southeast toward the Lower Bridge. Between them was only
a thin line of riflemen. If McClellan now delivered simultaneous
hammer blows from northeast, east, and southeast, he would surely
destroy Lee’s weak defensive setup. But if he continued his piece-meal
attacks, Lee could keep on shuttling his brigades back and
forth to meet them. And this is what they both did.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig38"> <ANTIMG src="images/p21.jpg" alt="" width-obs="450" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, who led Jackson’s counterattack after the ambush.</i> Courtesy, Frederick Hill Meserve Collection.</p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig39"> <ANTIMG src="images/p21a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="444" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<h2 id="c13"><span class="small"><i>The Fight for the Sunken Road</i></span></h2>
<p>Sedgwick may have wondered, in the moments before the Confederate
onslaught in the West Woods, why General French was not
closely following him. Nor is it clear, in view of French’s instructions,
why he did not do so.</p>
<p>French’s troops had crossed Pry’s Mill Ford in Sedgwick’s wake.
After marching about a mile west, they had veered south toward
the Roulette farmhouse, possibly drawn that way by the fire of
enemy skirmishers. Continuing to advance, they became engaged
with Confederate infantry at the farmhouse and in a ravine which
inclines southward to a ridge. On the crest of this ridge, a strong
enemy force waited in a deeply cut lane—the Sunken Road.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_35">35</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig40"> <ANTIMG src="images/p21b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="524" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Mumma farm, left; Roulette farmhouse, far right. This view looking east from Hagerstown Pike. French’s division advanced from left toward the Sunken Road, which is off picture to the right. Both farmhouses seen in this modern view were
here at time of the battle.</i></p>
</div>
<p>Worn down by farm use and the wash of heavy rains, this natural
trench joins the Hagerstown Pike 500 yards south of the
Dunker Church. From this point the road runs east about 1,000
yards, then turns south toward the Boonsboro Pike. That first
1,000 yards was soon to be known as Bloody Lane.</p>
<p>Posted in the road embankment were the five brigades of D. H.
Hill. At dawn these men had faced east, their line crossing the
Sunken Road. But under the pressure of the Federal attacks on the
Confederate left, they had swung northward. Three of Hill’s brigades
had been drawn into the fight around the Dunker Church.
Then Greene’s Federals had driven them back toward the Sunken
Road. There Hill rallied his troops. About 10:30 a.m., as the men
were piling fence rails on the embankment to strengthen the position,
a strong enemy force appeared on their front, steadily advancing
with parade-like precision. It was French’s division, heading
up the ravine toward Sunken Road Ridge.</p>
<p>Crouched at the road embankment, Hill’s men delivered a galling
fire into French’s ranks. The Federals fell back, then charged again.
One Union officer later wrote: “For three hours and thirty minutes
the battle raged incessantly, without either party giving way.”</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_36">36</div>
<p>But French’s division alone could not maintain its hold on the
ridge. Hurt by fire from Confederates in the road and on either
side, the Union men gave way. Still it was not over. French’s reserve
brigade now rushed up, restoring order in the disorganized
ranks; once again the division moved forward.</p>
<p>Now, opportunely, Maj. Gen. Israel Richardson’s Federal division—also
of Sumner’s corps—arrived on the left of French and was
about to strike Hill’s right flank in the road embankment.</p>
<p>It was a critical moment for the Confederates. Aware that loss
of the Sunken Road might bring disaster, Lee ordered forward his
last reserve—the five brigades of Maj. Gen. R. H. Anderson’s division.
At the same time Brig. Gen. Robert Rodes of Hill’s division
launched a furious attack to hold the Federals back until Anderson’s
men could arrive. This thrust kept French’s men from aiding
Richardson, who even now prepared to assault the Confederates in
the road.</p>
<p>As French’s attack halted, Richardson swept forward in magnificent
array. Richardson was a tough old fighter—bluff and courageous,
a leader of men. One of his officers recalled his leading the
advance, sword in hand: “Where’s General ——?” he cried.
Some soldiers answered, “Behind the haystack!” “G— d— the field
officers!” the old man roared, pushing on with his men toward the
Sunken Road. In three units they passed to the east of the
Roulette farmhouse and charged the Confederates at the crest of
the ridge.</p>
<p>As the struggle increased in fury, R. H. Anderson’s brigades arrived
in the rear of Hill’s troops in the road. But Anderson fell
wounded soon after his arrival, and suddenly the charging Confederate
counteroffensive lost its punch. By a mistaken order, Rodes’
men in the Sunken Road near the Roulette lane withdrew to the
rear. A dangerous gap opened on the Confederate front. The artillerist
Lt. Col. E. P. Alexander wrote later, “When Rodes’ brigade
left the sunken road ... Lee’s army was ruined, and the end of
the Confederacy was in sight.”</p>
<p>Union Col. Francis Barlow saw the gap in the Confederate front
opened by Rodes’ withdrawal. Quickly swinging two regiments
astride the road, he raked its length with perfectly timed volleys.
Routed by this devastating enfilade, the Confederate defenders fled
the road and retreated south toward Sharpsburg. Only a heroic
rally by D. H. Hill’s men prevented a breakthrough into the town.</p>
<p>The Sunken Road was now Bloody Lane. Dead Confederates lay
so thick there, wrote one Federal soldier, that as far down the road
as he could see, a man could have walked upon them without once
touching ground.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_37">37</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig41"> <ANTIMG src="images/p22.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="530" /> <p class="pcap"><i>On the Firing Line.</i> By Gilbert Gaul. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_38">38</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig42"> <ANTIMG src="images/p23.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="781" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Bloody Lane.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_39">39</div>
<p>The Federals had suffered heavily, too. Their bodies covered the
approaches to the ridge. In the final moments, while leading his
men in pursuit, Colonel Barlow had been seriously wounded; and
shortly after, his commander, General Richardson, had fallen with a
mortal wound.</p>
<p>The fight for the Sunken Road had exhausted both sides. At
1 p.m. they halted, and panting men grabbed their canteens to
swish the dust and powder from their rasping throats.</p>
<p>The Confederate retreat from Bloody Lane had uncovered a great
gap in the center of Lee’s line. A final plunge through this hole
would sever the Confederate army into two parts that could be destroyed
in detail. “Only a few scattered handfuls of Harvey Hill’s
division were left,” wrote Gen. William Allen, “and R. H. Anderson’s
was hopelessly confused and broken.... There was no body
of Confederate infantry in this part of the field that could have resisted
a serious advance.” So desperate was the situation that General
Longstreet himself held horses for his staff while they served
two cannon supporting Hill’s thin line.</p>
<p>But McClellan’s caution stopped the breakthrough before it was
born. Though Franklin’s VI Corps was massed for attack, McClellan
restrained it. “It would not be prudent to make the attack,” he
told Franklin after a brief examination of the situation, “our position
on the right being ... considerably in advance of what it had
been in the morning.”</p>
<p>So McClellan turned to defensive measures. Franklin’s reserve
corps would not be committed, but would remain in support of
the Federal right. And in the center, McClellan held back Fitz-John
Porter’s V Corps. After all, reasoned the Federal commander, was
not this the only force that stood between the enemy and the Federal
supply train on the Boonsboro Pike?</p>
<p>But Porter was not quite alone. The entire Federal artillery reserve
stood with him. Further, Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton had
placed his cavalry and artillery on a commanding ridge west of the
Middle Bridge during the morning. From here he had already supported
the attack by Sumner’s corps on the Sunken Road, and he
had aided Burnside’s efforts on the left. Now he stood poised for
further action. Pleasonton was to wait in vain. His dual purpose
of obtaining “... an enfilading fire upon the enemy in front of
Burnside, and of enabling Sumner to advance to Sharpsburg” was
nullified by McClellan’s decision to halt and take the defensive.</p>
<p>In striking contrast to McClellan’s caution, General Lee was at
that very moment considering a complete envelopment of the Federal
flank at the North and East Woods. By this means he might
relieve the pressure on D. H. Hill; for despite the lull, Lee could
not believe that McClellan had halted the attack there. If the attack
in the North Woods succeeded, Lee hoped to drive the Federal
<span class="pb" id="Page_40">40</span>
remnants to the banks of Antietam Creek and administer a crushing
defeat.</p>
<p>Jackson and J. E. B. Stuart, early in the afternoon, shifted northward
and prepared to charge the Federal lines. When they arrived
close to the powerful Federal artillery on Poffenberger Ridge, they
saw that a Confederate attack there would be shattered by these
massed guns. A wholesome respect for Federal artillerists now forced
Lee to withdraw his order. As he did so, heavy firing to the south
heralded a new threat developing there.</p>
<h2 id="c14"><span class="small"><i>Burnside Takes the Lower Bridge</i></span></h2>
<p>During the morning of the 17th, Confederate observers on the
ridge north of Sharpsburg had spotted masses of Federals moving
southward beyond Antietam Creek. These were the four divisions
of Burnside’s IX Corps concentrating for the attack on the Lower
Bridge.</p>
<p>Topography at the Lower Bridge heavily favored the few hundred
Georgia men who defended it under the leadership of Brig. Gen.
Robert Toombs. The road approaching the east end of the bridge
swings on a course paralleling that of Antietam Creek; in the last
few hundred yards before reaching the bridge, the road plunges into
a funnel-like depression between the opposing bluffs of the creek.
Toombs’ men were in rifle pits on the west bluff overlooking the
bridge and the approach road.</p>
<p>Because of faulty reconnaissance, Burnside did not know that fords
were nearby where his men could have waded across the stream. Instead,
the Federal plan of attack forced the advancing columns to
pile into this funnel and storm across the bridge.</p>
<p>Soon after 9 a.m., the Federal divisions began to assault the bridge.
One after another, their gallant charges were broken by deadly short-range
fire from Toombs’ Georgians. By noon, when the agony at the
Sunken Road was reaching its highest pitch, and despite repeated orders
from McClellan to get across Antietam Creek at all costs, the
bottleneck at the bridge was still unbroken.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Isaac Rodman’s Union division had moved
slowly downstream from the bridge in search of a crossing. Rounding
a sharp bend in the creek, nearly a mile south, scouts came
upon shallow water at Snavely’s Ford. Late in the morning Rodman
crossed the stream and began to drive against the right flank of
the Georgians guarding the bridge. About the same time, Col. George
Crook’s scouts located a ford a few hundred yards above the bridge;
there he sent his brigade across. Capt. Seth J. Simonds’ battery was
placed in position to command the bridge.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_41">41</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig43"> <ANTIMG src="images/p24.jpg" alt="" width-obs="472" height-obs="599" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside.</i> From photograph by Brady or assistant. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig44"> <ANTIMG src="images/p24a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="568" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Burnside or Lower Bridge shortly after the battle. Toombs’ men were on the bluff in background.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_42">42</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig45"> <ANTIMG src="images/p25.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="590" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Burnside’s men storm the bridge.</i> From wartime sketch by Forbes.</p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig46"> <ANTIMG src="images/p25a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="602" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The same view today. Note how tree at near end of bridge has grown.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_43">43</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig47"> <ANTIMG src="images/p25b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="444" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Zouaves of Burnside’s IX Corps charge toward Sharpsburg.</i> From wartime sketch by Forbes. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<dl class="undent pcap"><br/>Charge of Burnsides 9<sup>th</sup> Corps, on the right flank of the rebel army, Antietam, 3.30 p.m. Sept 17
<br/>1 The Town of Sharpsburg.
<br/>2 The Old Lutheran Church.
<br/>3 9<sup>th</sup> N.Y. Vols. Hawkins Zouaves.
<br/>4 Rebels retreating into the town.
<br/>5 Rebel line of battle.
<p>At 1 p.m., the defending Confederates saw a sudden stir across Antietam
Creek. Two regiments, the 51st New York and the 51st Pennsylvania,
marched swiftly out from the cover of the wooded hill and
charged for the bridge. Supported now by converging artillery fire,
they quickly formed into columns and were over the bridge before
Confederate artillery could halt them. Soon a wide gap split the
Confederate defense. Masses of Federal troops poured across the
bridge while Rodman and Crook hammered the Confederate flanks.
Burnside’s men had gained the west bank of the creek.</p>
<p>But again there was fateful delay as Burnside paused to reorganize.
By the time he was ready to drive the Southern defenders from the
ridge in his front, 2 critical hours had passed.</p>
<p>Close to 3 p.m., the mighty Federal line moved slowly up the
hill toward Sharpsburg, then gained momentum. “The movement
of the dark column,” related an observer, “with arms and banners
glittering in the sun, following the double line of skirmishers, dashing
forward at a trot, loading and firing alternately as they moved, was
one of the most brilliant and exciting exhibitions of the day.”</p>
<p>First brushing aside the depleted ranks in the rifle pits above the
bridge, the Federals struck D. R. Jones’ four lonely brigades on the
hills southeast of Sharpsburg—whence every other Confederate infantry
unit had been withdrawn to reinforce the line to the north.
Unable to stem the massive Federal attack, Jones’ men were driven
back toward the town.</p>
<p>To halt the Federal tide, Lee shifted all available artillery southward.
<span class="pb" id="Page_44">44</span>
By 4 p.m., however, the Federals were approaching the village
itself; only a half mile lay between them and Lee’s line of retreat
to the Potomac. Disaster seemed at hand for Lee’s decimated force.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig48"> <ANTIMG src="images/p26.jpg" alt="" width-obs="795" height-obs="475" /> <p class="pcap"><i>A Confederate battery on this site on the Harpers Ferry Road fired on Burnside’s men as they charged toward the left across the low ground in the middle distance. A. P. Hill’s division marched behind these guns, going left, then turned off the road and
passed through the cornfield to hit Burnside’s corps in flank.</i></p>
</div>
<h2 id="c15"><span class="small"><i>A. P. Hill Turns the Tide</i></span></h2>
<p>But now came a great moment in Confederate military annals.
A. P. Hill’s notable Light Division, having hurriedly crossed the
Potomac, 3 miles away, was driving hard toward the jubilant Federals
charging on Sharpsburg. Some of Hill’s artillery had already
arrived from Harpers Ferry with the cheering news that Hill’s brigades
of infantry were close by.</p>
<p>At Lee’s urgent order, Hill had left Harpers Ferry early. Sensing
the critical role they would play, urged on at sword point by their
grim commander, Hill’s veterans had covered the 17 miles from
Harpers Ferry to the Potomac in 7 hours. Hundreds of men had
fallen out, unable to keep the pace. Now, across the river, the
stalwart survivors pounded on toward the sound of the guns.</p>
<p>Suddenly the head of Hill’s column appeared on the road to the
south. Hill rode up to Lee’s headquarters at the Oak Grove, then
quickly to D. R. Jones, whose exhausted troops formed the last defense
<span class="pb" id="Page_45">45</span>
line in front of Sharpsburg. Hill’s five brigades now rushed
toward the Federal flank. Confusion gripped Burnside’s men as this
unexpected onslaught plowed into their lines. Men broke and started
to run. In moments the tide had turned. The Federal lines, sagging
from the overwhelming charge of the Southerners, and with
gaping holes cut by artillery, fell back across the hills to the sheltering
banks of Antietam Creek.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig49"> <ANTIMG src="images/p26a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="489" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill.</i> From an engraving by A. H. Ritchie.</p> </div>
<p>Powerful Federal artillery continued to thunder across the hills;
heavy blue columns could still be seen in overmastering strength
across Antietam Creek and far to the north. But the Federal commander
had called a halt.</p>
<p>An hour and a half after the timely arrival of A. P. Hill’s division
from Harpers Ferry, the battle ended. With sunset, the firing died
away. That night, the tired men lay on their arms in line of battle.
Neither side would admit defeat; neither could claim the victory.</p>
<h2 id="c16"><span class="small"><i>Retreat from Sharpsburg</i></span></h2>
<p>Seldom had Lee’s army fought a battle so strenuous and so long.
“The sun,” a soldier wrote, “seemed almost to go backwards, and
it appeared as if night would never come.” From dawn to sunset,
the Confederate commander had thrown into battle every organized
unit north of the Potomac. Straggling in the days preceding
Antietam had reduced Lee’s army from 55,000 to 41,000 men. This
small force had sustained five major attacks by McClellan’s 87,000-man
<span class="pb" id="Page_46">46</span>
army—three in the West Woods and the Miller cornfield, and
those at the Sunken Road and the Lower Bridge—each time the
outcome hanging in the balance.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig50"> <ANTIMG src="images/p27.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="476" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Blackford’s Ford from the Maryland side of the Potomac.</i></p> </div>
<p>In the stillness of the night, Lee called his commanders to his
headquarters west of Sharpsburg. Of each in turn he asked the
condition of the men, and each, even Jackson, spoke against renewal
of battle on the morrow. “Still too weak to assume the offensive,”
Lee wrote later, “we waited without apprehension the renewal of the
attack.”</p>
<p>Early on the following morning, it became apparent that McClellan
was not going to attack, though during the night he had received
strong reinforcements, and more were on the way. Still undaunted,
Lee returned to his plan of striking the Federal right at Poffenberger
Ridge. But after surveying the ground, his officers informed him
that Federal batteries completely dominated the narrow strip of land
over which the attack must be launched. An attempt against the
Federal guns would be suicidal.</p>
<p>Balked in his last hope of a counteroffensive, Lee realized that
he could not recall the decision won by McClellan at South Mountain:
The campaign was lost. During the afternoon, he announced
to his lieutenants his intention of withdrawing that night across
the Potomac. At midnight Longstreet led the way across Blackford’s
Ford and formed a protective line on the south bank.
Steadily through the night and early morning, the Confederate
columns crossed over into Virginia.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_47">47</div>
<p>McClellan did not actively pursue. As the days passed and Lee’s
army withdrew into the Shenandoah Valley, President Lincoln became
impatient. The time was at hand, he thought, for the
decisive blow. Calling upon McClellan on the field of Antietam,
October 1, Lincoln urged a vigorous pursuit of the Confederate
army. McClellan insisted that his army required reorganization and
new equipment. The President, having lost all confidence in
McClellan, removed him from command on November 7.</p>
<h2 id="c17"><span class="small"><i>The Battle and the Campaign</i></span></h2>
<p>Tactically, Antietam was a draw. Strategically, however, it was a
Northern victory because it halted Lee’s invasion.</p>
<p>Though McClellan failed to destroy Lee’s army, his contribution
was in many ways notable. In the 3 weeks after he was chosen
for command on September 3, he provided for Washington’s defense,
created a new field army, fought two major actions, compelled
Lee’s evacuation of Maryland, and established Federal control
of the Potomac River from Washington to Williamsport. That he
was not a daring commander of Lee’s stripe cannot detract from
these solid achievements.</p>
<p>Lee, on the other hand, may have been too daring. Because of
this he made two major miscalculations. First, his invasion of
Maryland imposed a strain that his poorly equipped and exhausted
army could not support; heavy straggling was the surest evidence
of this. Second, he misjudged the capacity of the enemy to recuperate
from the effects of Second Manassas and quickly put a reliable
field army on his trail. He did achieve one of his objectives:
The delay of the Federal armies in resuming major offensive operations
in Virginia until the next winter. But the price was high and
the South could not afford the kind of attrition suffered in the
campaign.</p>
<p>Casualties were so heavy in the Battle of Antietam that September
17, 1862, is termed the bloodiest day of the Civil War. Of
McClellan’s 26,023 killed, wounded, and captured during the Maryland
Campaign (including Harpers Ferry), he counted 12,410 at
Antietam. Of Lee’s 13,385 casualties during the campaign, 10,700
fell at Antietam.</p>
<h2 id="c18"><span class="small"><i>The War for the Union Takes on a New Purpose</i></span></h2>
<p>After Antietam there was no serious threat of foreign recognition or
intervention on behalf of the Confederacy. And the repulse inflicted
on Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia gave Abraham Lincoln
the opportunity he had sought: On September 22—just 5 days after
the battle—the President issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.
It declared that upon the first day of January next all
slaves within any State or district then in rebellion against the
United States “... shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free.”</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_48">48</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig51"> <ANTIMG src="images/p28.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="590" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Lincoln visits McClellan and his staff after the battle. McClellan is the fourth man to the left from the President.</i> Courtesy, National Archives.</p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig52"> <ANTIMG src="images/p28a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="590" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Lincoln and McClellan confer on the field of Antietam.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_49">49</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig53"> <ANTIMG src="images/p28b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="520" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The President reads the Emancipation Proclamation to his cabinet.</i> From an engraving based on the painting by Francis Bicknell Carpenter. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<p>With the formal Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863,
the war took on new purpose. In the North, and in many foreign
lands, the cause of American Union had become one with that of
human liberty.</p>
<h2 id="c19"><span class="small"><i>Clara Barton at Antietam</i></span></h2>
<p>At Antietam, also, was Clara Barton, founder of the American Red
Cross. On this field of desolation, long after the guns had ceased,
Miss Barton was still busily rendering care to the wounded and dying.
Having arrived early in the day in the northern area of battle, she
witnessed the wounded men of Sedgwick’s depleted ranks streaming
to the cover of North and East Woods. By midmorning her
<span class="pb" id="Page_50">50</span>
wagonload of supplies, donated by the citizens of Washington, had
arrived. She worked tirelessly with army surgeons at the field hospital
on the Joseph Poffenberger farm. Her supply of bandages,
linens, anesthetics, and oil lanterns replenished the surgeons’ urgent
need of dressings and provided light to carry on through the night.
So outstanding were her services on the field of battle that she later
received official recognition by the United States Army Medical
Corps. Her work here and later would become basic to the establishment
of the American Red Cross.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig54"> <ANTIMG src="images/p29.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="583" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Barn near Keedysville, used as field hospital after the battle.</i> Courtesy, National Archives.</p> </div>
<h2 id="c20"><span class="small"><i>Antietam National Battlefield and Cemetery</i></span></h2>
<p>The Antietam National Battlefield was established August 30, 1890,
to commemorate the significant events of September 17, 1862, and
to preserve the important features of the battlefield. Administered
by the War Department until 1933, the site was transferred that
year to the U.S. Department of the Interior to be administered by
the National Park Service.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_51">51</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig55"> <ANTIMG src="images/p29a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="434" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Clara Barton.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig56"> <ANTIMG src="images/p29b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="639" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Citizen volunteers assisting the wounded at Antietam.</i> From wartime sketch by Waud. Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_52">52</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig57"> <ANTIMG src="images/p30.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="573" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maryland Monument.</i></p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig58"> <ANTIMG src="images/p30a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="404" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Turner’s Gap looking east.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_53">53</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig59"> <ANTIMG src="images/p30c.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="634" /> <p class="pcap"><i>War Correspondents’ Memorial Arch at Crampton’s Gap.</i></p> </div>
<p>The Battle of Antietam was fought over an area of 12 square miles.
The site today consists of 810 acres containing approximately 8½
miles of tour roads. Located along the battlefield avenues to
mark battle positions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry are many
monuments, markers, and narrative tablets. Similar markers describe
the actions at Turner’s Gap, Harpers Ferry, and Blackford’s
Ford.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig60"> <ANTIMG src="images/p30d.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="578" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Lee headquarters marker in the Oak Grove.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_54">54</div>
<p>Key artillery positions on the field of Antietam are marked by
cannon. And 10 large-scale field exhibits at important points on
the field indicate troop positions and battle action.</p>
<p>The War Correspondents’ Memorial Arch and the 1st New Jersey
Regimental Monument are located at Crampton’s Gap, and at Fox’s
Gap is the memorial to Maj. Gen. Jesse Reno, who was killed
while leading the Federal attack there.</p>
<p>Outstanding in the observance of battle anniversaries at Antietam
was the occasion of the 75th anniversary on September 17, 1937.
Thirty-five thousand persons, including 50 veterans who fought at
Antietam, joined in the observance held on the battleground near
the Sunken Road.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig61"> <ANTIMG src="images/p31.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="595" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The National Cemetery.</i></p> </div>
<p>The Robert E. Lee Memorial tablet, located in a plot at the
<span class="pb" id="Page_55">55</span>
western limits of Sharpsburg, marks the headquarters of General
Lee. General McClellan’s headquarters were in the Philip Pry house,
2 miles east of Sharpsburg near the Boonsboro Pike.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig62"> <ANTIMG src="images/p31a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="541" /> <p class="pcap"><i>McClellan’s headquarters, the Philip Pry House.</i></p> </div>
<p>The National Cemetery, located at the eastern limits of Sharpsburg,
is the burial place of Federal dead from the Battles of Antietam,
South Mountain, and minor engagements. The cemetery was
established by an act of the Maryland legislature in March 1865;
the dedication took place September 17, 1867, the fifth anniversary
of the battle. The cemetery plot of 11 acres was deeded by the
State of Maryland to the United States Government on March 13,
1878. Of 4,776 Civil War burials, 1,836 are listed as unidentified.
The total number of burials, including nearly 300 from recent wars,
is more than 5,000.</p>
<h2 id="c21"><span class="small"><i>Administration</i></span></h2>
<p>The Antietam National Battlefield is a part of the National Park
System, owned by the people of the United States and administered
for them by the National Park Service, U.S. Department of the
Interior. Communications should be addressed to the Superintendent,
Antietam National Battlefield, P.O. Box 158, Sharpsburg, Maryland
21782.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_56">56</div>
<h2 id="c22"><span class="small"><i>Suggested Readings</i></span></h2>
<p class="book"><span class="sc">Bradford, Ned</span>, editor, <i>Battles and Leaders of the Civil War</i>. Appleton-Century-Crofts,
New York, 1956.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>These selections from the original four volume 1887-88 edition
are excellent for on-the-spot impressions of participants. Should
be used with caution concerning historical accuracy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="book"><span class="sc">Catton, Bruce</span>, <i>Mr. Lincoln’s Army</i>. Doubleday & Company,
Garden City, 1951.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Popular well-written interpretive study with colorful battle accounts.
Descriptions of camplife are very good.</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="book"><span class="sc">Commager, Henry S.</span>, editor, <i>The Blue and the Gray</i>. Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., New York, 1950.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Fine selection of readings from the pens of participants. Again,
as with <i>Battles and Leaders</i>, these accounts suffer from immediacy
and should be used with caution.</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="book"><span class="sc">Freeman, D. S.</span>, <i>R. E. Lee</i>, Vol. II. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New
York, 1934.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Outstanding as biography and as military history. Detailed
analysis of Lee’s actions as commander with vivid battle descriptions.
Excellent footnotes for further reference.</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="book"><span class="sc">Hassler, Warren W., Jr.</span>, <i>General George B. McClellan, Shield of
the Union</i>. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1957.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Interesting interpretation of McClellan’s actions as Federal commander.
His difficulties with subordinates, especially Burnside,
are used to explain Federal failure to take advantage of opportunities
at Antietam.</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="book"><span class="sc">Henderson, G. F. R.</span>, <i>Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War</i>.
Longmans, Green and Company, London, 1955 reprint.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is a modern reprint of Henderson’s classic military biography,
first printed in 1898; it is still a standard work on the
legendary Jackson.</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="book"><span class="sc">Longstreet, James</span>, <i>From Manassas to Appomattox</i>. J. B. Lippincott
and Company, Philadelphia, 1896.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Written many years after the war, this account by a leading
participant emphasizes his own point of view.</p>
</blockquote>
<div class="pb" id="Page_57">57</div>
<h2 id="c23"><span class="small"><span class="center">APPENDIX</span> <i>The Emancipation Proclamation</i></span></h2>
<p>On August 22, 1862, just one month before Abraham Lincoln issued
the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, he wrote a letter to
Horace Greeley, abolitionist editor of the New York Tribune. The
letter read in part:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution.
The sooner the National authority can be restored, the nearer the
Union will be “the Union as it was.” If there be those who would not save
the Union unless they could at the same time <i>save</i> Slavery, I do not agree
with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could
at the same time <i>destroy</i> Slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object
in this struggle <i>is</i> to save the Union, and is <i>not</i> either to save or destroy Slavery....
I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty, and I
intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere
could be free....</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For some months before the Battle of Antietam, as his letter to
Greeley indicates, Lincoln had been wrestling with the problem of
slavery and its connection with the war. He became convinced that
a new spiritual and moral force—emancipation of the slaves—must
be injected into the Union cause, else the travail of war might
dampen the fighting spirit of the North. If this loss of vitality
should come to pass, the paramount political objective of restoring
the Union might never be attained.</p>
<p>Another compelling factor in Lincoln’s thinking was the need to
veer European opinion away from its sympathy for the South. A
war to free the slaves would enlist the support of Europe in a way
that a war for purely political objectives could not.</p>
<p>Thus, slowly and with much soul searching, Lincoln’s official
view of his duty came to correspond with his personal wish for
human freedom. The outcome of these deliberations was the
Emancipation Proclamation.</p>
<p>The Federal victory at Antietam gave Lincoln the opportunity to
issue the proclamation—a dramatic step toward eliminating slavery
in the United States.</p>
<p>By this act, Lincoln stretched the Constitution to the limit of its
meaning. His interpretation of presidential war powers was revolutionary.
It would become a precedent for other Presidents who
would similarly find constitutional authority for emergency action
in time of war.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_58">58</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig63"> <ANTIMG src="images/p32.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="956" /> <p class="pcap"><i>First page of Lincoln’s handwritten draft of the formal Emancipation Proclamation.</i> Courtesy, Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_59">59</div>
<p>More important, the proclamation was to inaugurate a revolution
in human relationships. Although Congress had previously enacted
laws concerning the slaves that went substantially as far as the
Emancipation Proclamation, the laws had lacked the dramatic and
symbolic import of Lincoln’s words. Dating from the proclamation,
the war became a crusade and the vital force of abolition sentiment
was captured for the Union cause, both at home and abroad—especially
in England.</p>
<p>The immediate practical effects of the Emancipation Proclamation
were negligible, applying as it did only to those areas “in rebellion”
where it could not be enforced. But its message became a symbol
and a goal which opened the way for universal emancipation in
the future. Thus the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
to the Constitution are direct progeny of Lincoln’s
proclamation.</p>
<p>Any document with the long-term importance of the Emancipation
Proclamation deserves to be read by those who experience its
effects. Following is the text of the formal Emancipation Proclamation,
issued on January 1, 1863:</p>
<blockquote>
<p class="tbcenter">BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
<br/><br/>A Proclamation.</p>
<p>Whereas on the 22d day of September, A.D. 1862, a proclamation was issued
by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the
following, to wit:</p>
<p>“That on the 1st day of January, A.D. 1863, all persons held as slaves
within any State or designated part of a State the people whereof shall then
be in rebellion against the United States shall be then, thenceforward, and forever
free; and the executive government of the United States, including the
military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom
of such persons and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of
them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.</p>
<p>“That the executive will on the 1st day of January aforesaid, by proclamation,
designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof,
respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact
that any State or the people thereof shall on that day be in good faith represented
in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at
elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such States shall have
participated shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed
conclusive evidence that such State and the people thereof are not then in
rebellion against the United States.”</p>
<p>Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by
virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority
and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war
<span class="pb" id="Page_60">60</span>
measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this 1st day of January, A.D.
1863, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the
full period of one hundred days from the first day above mentioned, order and
designate as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof, respectively,
are this day in rebellion against the United States the following, to wit:</p>
<p>Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Paquemines,
Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terrebonne,
Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans),
Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and
Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also
the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northhampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess
Anne, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and
which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation
were not issued.</p>
<p>And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and
declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts
of States are, and henceforward shall be, free; and that the Executive Government
of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof
will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.</p>
<p>And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain
from all violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them
that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages.</p>
<p>And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition
will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison
forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in
said service.</p>
<p>And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by
the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgement
of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God.</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="jr1"><span class="small"><b>U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1986 0 - 157-109: QL 3</b></span></p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_61">61</div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p33.jpg" alt="Maryland Seal" width-obs="500" height-obs="551" /></div>
<div class="box">
<h2 id="c24"><span class="small"><span class="ss"><span class="xxlarge">Antietam</span></span></span> <br/><span class="ss">National Battlefield <br/>Maryland <br/>National Park Service <br/>U.S. Department of the Interior</span></h2></div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig64"> <ANTIMG src="images/p34.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="239" /> <p class="pcap"><b>The Federal attack across Burnside Bridge, as portrayed (somewhat fancifully) in a postwar chromolithograph by Kurz & Allison.</b> Library of Congress</p>
</div>
<h2 id="c25"><span class="small"><span class="ss">The Bloodiest Day of the Civil War</span></span></h2>
<p>The Battle of Antietam (or Sharpsburg) on
September 17, 1862, climaxed the first of
Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee’s two attempts
to carry the war into the North.
About 40,000 Southerners were pitted against
the 87,000-man Federal Army of the Potomac
under Gen. George B. McClellan. And
when the fighting ended, the course of the
American Civil War had been greatly altered.</p>
<p>After his great victory at Manassas in August,
Lee had marched his Army of Northern Virginia
into Maryland, hoping to find vitally
needed men and supplies. McClellan followed,
first to Frederick (where through rare
good fortune a copy of the Confederate
battle plan, Lee’s Special Order No. 191,
fell into his hands), then westward 12 miles
to the passes of South Mountain. There
on September 14, at Turner’s, Fox’s, and
Crampton’s gaps, Lee tried to block the Federals.
But because he had split his army to
send troops under Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall”
Jackson to capture Harpers Ferry, Lee
could only hope to delay the Northerners.
McClellan forced his way through, and by
the afternoon September 15 both armies
had established new battlelines west and
east of Antietam Creek near the town of
Sharpsburg. When Jackson’s troops reached
Sharpsburg on the 16th, Harpers Ferry having
surrendered the day before, Lee consolidated
his position along the low ridge that
runs north and south of the town.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig65"> <ANTIMG src="images/p34c.jpg" alt="" width-obs="435" height-obs="453" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">“War is a dreadful thing.... Oh, my God, can’t this civil strife be
brought to an end.”</span></p>
<p class="pcap">Clara Barton, who
tended the wounded
at Antietam during
and after the battle.</p>
</div>
<p>The battle opened at dawn on the 17th when
Union Gen. Joseph Hooker’s artillery began
a murderous fire on Jackson’s men in the Miller
cornfield north of town. “In the time I am
writing,” Hooker reported, “every stalk of
corn in the northern and greater part of the
field was cut as closely as could have been
done with a knife, and the slain lay in rows
precisely as they had stood in their ranks a
few moments before.” Hooker’s troops advanced,
driving the Confederates before
them, and Jackson reported that his men
were “exposed for near an hour to a terrific
storm of shell, canister, and musketry.”</p>
<p>About 7 a.m. Jackson was reenforced and
succeeded in driving the Federals back. An
hour later Union troops under Gen. Joseph
Mansfield counterattacked and by 9 o’clock
had regained some of the lost ground. Then,
in an effort to extricate some of Mansfield’s
men from their isolated position near the
Dunker Church, Gen. John Sedgwick’s division
of Edwin V. Sumner’s corps advanced
into the West Woods. There Confederate
troops struck Sedgwick’s men on both flanks,
inflicting appalling casualties.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig66"> <ANTIMG src="images/p34e.jpg" alt="" width-obs="436" height-obs="441" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">“I have always had a high opinion of General McClellan, and
have no reason to
suppose that he failed
to accomplish anything
that he was able
to do.”</span></p>
<p class="pcap">Robert E. Lee</p>
</div>
<p>Meanwhile, Gen. William H. French’s division
of Sumner’s corps moved up to support
Sedgwick but veered south into Confederates
under Gen. D. H. Hill posted along an
old sunken road separating the Roulette and
Piper farms. For nearly 4 hours, from 9:30
a.m. to 1 p.m., bitter fighting raged along
this road (afterwards known as Bloody Lane)
as French, supported by Gen. Israel B. Richardson’s
division, also of Sumner’s corps,
sought to drive the southerners back. Confusion
and sheer exhaustion finally ended
the battle here and in the northern part of the
field generally.</p>
<p>Southeast of town, Union Gen. Ambrose E.
Burnside’s troops had been trying to cross
a bridge over Antietam Creek since 9:30 a.m.
Some 400 Georgians had driven them back
each time. At 1 p.m. the Federals finally
crossed the bridge (now known as Burnside
Bridge) and, after a 2-hour delay to reform
their lines, advanced up the slope beyond.
By late afternoon they had driven the Georgians
back almost to Sharpsburg, threatening
to cut off the line of retreat for Lee’s
decimated Confederates. Then about 4 p.m.
Gen. A. P. Hill’s division, left behind by
Jackson at Harpers Ferry to salvage the
captured Federal property, arrived on the
field and immediately entered the fight. Burnside’s
troops were driven back to the heights
near the bridge they had earlier taken. The
Battle of Antietam was over. The next day
Lee began withdrawing his army across the
Potomac River.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig67"> <ANTIMG src="images/p34f.jpg" alt="" width-obs="431" height-obs="439" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">“If I cannot whip Bobbie Lee, I will be willing to go home.”</span></p> <p class="pcap">George B. McClellan</p>
</div>
<p>More men were killed or wounded at Antietam
on September 17, 1862, than on any other
single day of the Civil War. Federal losses
were 12,410, Confederate losses 10,700.
Although neither side gained a decisive
victory, Lee’s failure to carry the war effort
effectively into the North caused Great
Britain to postpone recognition of the Confederate
government. The battle also gave
President Abraham Lincoln the opportunity
to issue the Emancipation Proclamation,
which, on January 1, 1863, declared free all
slaves in States still in rebellion against the
United States. Now the war had a dual
purpose: to preserve the Union and end
slavery.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig68"> <ANTIMG src="images/p34g.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="338" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">Sharpsburg, Md., looking southwest along Main Street, September 21 or 22, 1862. Library of Congress</span></p> </div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p35.jpg" alt="1" width-obs="637" height-obs="310" /></div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p35b.jpg" alt="9" width-obs="627" height-obs="311" /></div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p35c.jpg" alt="11" width-obs="635" height-obs="311" /></div>
<h2 id="c26"><span class="small"><span class="ss">About Your Visit</span></span></h2>
<p>Antietam National Battlefield lies north and
east of Sharpsburg, along Md. 34 and 65.
Both routes intersect either U.S. 40 or 40A
and Int. 70. The visitor center is north of
Sharpsburg on Md. 65 and is open daily except
Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Years
Day. All visitor center facilities and most tour
route exhibits are wheelchair accessible.</p>
<p>There are interpretive markers at Turner’s,
Fox’s, and Crampton’s Gaps on South Mountain
(scenes of preliminary fighting) and at
the Shepherdstown (W. Va.) Ford where
Lee’s army recrossed the Potomac.</p>
<p>While touring the park, stay alert to all traffic.
Bicyclists should use caution while descending
hills. Please use trails to avoid
contact with stinging nettles, ticks, and snakes.
Do not climb on cannons, monuments, fences,
or trees. Don’t spoil your visit with an accident.
<b>Note: Relic hunting is prohibited.</b></p>
<p>Antietam National Battlefield and Cemetery
are administered by the National Park Service,
U.S. Department of the Interior. A
superintendent, whose address is Box 158,
Sharpsburg, MD 21782, is in charge. Phone:
(301) 432-5124.</p>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p35d.jpg" alt="Area map" width-obs="756" height-obs="600" /></div>
<h2 id="c27"><span class="small"><span class="ss">Touring Antietam Battlefield</span></span></h2>
<p>Before starting your tour, stop at the visitor center
where exhibits and audio-visual programs provide
an introduction to the battle and the Maryland
Campaign. The numbered tour stops below are
arranged according to the sequence of the battle.</p>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p35e.jpg" alt="Battlefield map" width-obs="590" height-obs="1000" /></div>
<p class="tb"><span class="ss"><span class="large">Morning Phase (6 a.m. to 9 a.m.)</span></span></p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss">1 Dunker Church</span> This was the focal point of repeated
clashes as both armies sought to occupy
and hold the high ground around it. Leveled by a
storm in 1921, the church was rebuilt in 1962.</p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss">2 North Woods</span> General Hooker launched the
initial Union attack from this point. It was stopped
by Jackson’s troops in The Cornfield, ½ mile south.</p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss">3 East Woods</span> Union Gen. Joseph Mansfield was
fatally wounded here as he led his XII Corps into
battle.</p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss">4 The Cornfield</span> More fighting took place here in
the Miller cornfield than anywhere else at Antietam.
The battlelines swept back and forth across the field
for three hours.</p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss">5 West Woods</span> Union Gen. John Sedgwick’s division
lost more than 2,200 men in less than half an
hour in an ill-fated charge into these woods against
Jackson’s troops.</p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss">6 Mumma Farm</span> Burned by the Confederates to
prevent their use by Union sharpshooters, the
Mumma farm buildings were the only civilian property
purposely destroyed during the battle.</p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss"><span class="large">Midday Phase (9:30 a.m. to 1 p.m.)</span></span></p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss">7 Roulette Farm</span> Union troops under French and
Richardson crossed these fields on their way to
meet the Confederates posted in the Sunken Road.</p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss">8 Sunken Road (Bloody Lane)</span> For nearly 4 hours,
Union and Confederate infantry contested this
sunken country road, resulting in over 5,000
casualties. Thus the name “Bloody Lane”.</p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss"><span class="large">Afternoon Phase (1 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.)</span></span></p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss">9 Lower Bridge (Burnside Bridge)</span> The fighting
here was a key factor in McClellan’s failure at
Antietam. Called Burnside Bridge after the Union
general whose troops were held off most of the day
by a few hundred Georgia riflemen, it is the battlefield’s
best-known landmark.</p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss">10 The Final Attack</span> After taking the Lower Bridge
and reforming his corps, Burnside marched his
men across these hills toward Sharpsburg, threatening
to cut off Lee’s line of retreat. Just as the
Federals reached this area, A. P. Hill’s Confederate
division arrived from Harpers Ferry and drove
them back.</p>
<p class="book"><span class="ss">11 Antietam National Cemetery</span> The remains of
4,776 Federal soldiers, including 1,836 unknowns,
are buried in this hilltop cemetery near town. Most
of the Confederate dead are buried in Hagerstown
and Frederick, Md., Shepherdstown, W. Va., and in
local church and family cemeteries.</p>
<p class="tb">The battle of Antietam, fought over an area of 12
square miles, consisted of the three basic phases—morning,
midday, and afternoon—shown on the
maps at right. During the morning phase, three
piecemeal Union attacks drove back Jackson’s line,
but did not break it. The midday phase saw two
Union divisions break D. H. Hill’s line in the sunken
road, but McClellan’s failure to follow it up lost him
the advantage that had been gained. In the afternoon
phase, Burnside’s slow pincer movement
beyond the lower bridge was broken by A. P. Hill’s
timely arrival.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig69"> <ANTIMG src="images/p35f.jpg" alt="" width-obs="463" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">Morning Phase</span></p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig70"> <ANTIMG src="images/p35g.jpg" alt="" width-obs="451" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">Midday Phase</span></p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig71"> <ANTIMG src="images/p35h.jpg" alt="" width-obs="406" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">Afternoon Phase</span></p> </div>
<h2>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
<ul>
<li>Silently corrected a few typos.</li>
<li>Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook is public-domain in the country of publication.</li>
<li>In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by _underscores_.</li>
</ul>
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